Climate Change Crisis: Prescribing Alternative Economic Policy Using An Austrian Framework by McGill, Elina N
Rollins College
Rollins Scholarship Online
Honors Program Theses
Spring 2017
Climate Change Crisis: Prescribing Alternative
Economic Policy Using An Austrian Framework
Elina N. McGill
Rollins College, emcgill@rollins.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.rollins.edu/honors
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Economic Theory Commons, and
the Environmental Studies Commons
This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by Rollins Scholarship Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Program
Theses by an authorized administrator of Rollins Scholarship Online. For more information, please contact rwalton@rollins.edu.
Recommended Citation
McGill, Elina N., "Climate Change Crisis: Prescribing Alternative Economic Policy Using An Austrian Framework" (2017). Honors
Program Theses. 47.
http://scholarship.rollins.edu/honors/47
  
 
 
 
Climate Change Crisis:  
Prescribing Alternative Economic Policy Using An Austrian 
Framework 
 
 
 
 
Elina N. McGill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Senior Honors Proposal 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements of 
the Honors Degree Program 
 
 
Monday, May 1, 2017 
 
 
Faculty Sponsor: Professor Martina Vidovic 
Professor Avraham Baranes 
 
Advisor: Professor Mike Gunter 
 
Rollins College 
Winter Park, FL 
  
 
 
i 
Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the literature surrounding climate change adaptation and mitigation to assess 
the possible contributions and limitations of heterodox economics to climate change policy. 
Through interdisciplinary research between economics and environmental issues, this paper aims 
to stress the importance of utilizing heterodox schools of economics to create more pragmatic 
and dynamic policy. The secondary aim is to use Austrian frameworks to contribute to the 
construction of feasible, efficient, and equitable climate change policy. This paper used 
qualitative and textual analysis of the Austrian schools of economics conceptualize possible 
policy responses to climate change. Research found that the Austrian prescription of privatized 
climate change policy, though robust in internal validity, fallaciously believes in the power of 
property rights and tort litigation to feasibly, efficiently, and equitably resolve competing 
interests regarding the use of natural resources. Further research is needed to implicitly analyze 
the values hidden within adaptation and mitigation strategies. The limits and values of the social 
system dictate the limits and values that are carried over into economics and thus, climate change 
policy. It is necessary to understand and predict how economic systems, social systems, and 
institutions will evolve as economic stability, social cohesion, and institutional cooperation will 
affect the limits of climate change policy. Findings suggest that policy should abandon ‘either/or’ 
solutions in favor of ‘both/and’ solutions to climate change. This paper is useful in understanding 
environmental economics and institutional structures and evolution. The research provides 
further insight into heterodox perspectives of environmental economics.  
 
Keywords: climate change, adaptation, mitigation, neoclassical economics, Austrian economics, 
carbon pricing 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
In the summer of 2016, geologists investigated satellite images of the Aru mountain 
range that had radically shifted overnight. Two months later and without warning, the maps 
changed again. The serene, ice-covered Aru mountain range in northern Tibet commanded 
scientists’ and geologists’ attention on July 17. The avalanche cascaded through a table-top 
plateau and sent sixty million cubic meters of ice tumbling through a nearby valley. Twenty-four 
thousand Olympic-sized swimming pools of ice, rock and debris pummeled down on this village, 
killing nine people and hundreds of livestock (Ravilious 2016).  
Not only was this avalanche “exceedingly rare” for this part of the world, but its record-
breaking magnitude also alerted geologists (Ravilious 2016). The collapse in the Aru mountain 
range comes second only to the 2002 event in the Caucasus mountains (Ravilious 2016). After 
the ice settled and the mountains returned to their frozen slumber, over ten square kilometers1 of 
ice covered the terrain thirty meters2 deep. Then, surprising already baffled scientists, another 
avalanche occurred.  
A privately owned, high-resolution satellite, focused on this area due to increased activity 
months earlier, noticed something peculiar on September 19. A glacier near the initial collapse 
exhibited similar characteristics that coincided with the first avalanche: cracks, creases and 
crevasses that were not present before. Despite scientific predictions that forecasted a low 
probability of another avalanche, the second glacier failed on September 21 before transmitted 
satellite images had warned the Chinese government (Robinson 2016). A natural phenomenon of 
                                                 
1 38 square kilometers 
2 98.4 feet 
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such magnitude that had only occurred once before in recorded history happened twice within 
months. Geologist and debris-flow specialist Dave Petley commented, “That one such event 
should occur is remarkable; two is unprecedented” (Petley 2016).  
Eight years prior, the German government announced to the world that it was on target to 
reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 40% by 2020 (Van den Berg 2012b, 19). However, 
reports uncovered that Germany’s steel conglomerates were disassembled and transferred from 
the industrial Ruhr Valley in Germany to Jinfeng, China where companies could work their 
employees for longer hours, pay lower wages, and bypass environmental regulations (Van den 
Berg 2012b, 4). Though Germany reduced its emissions on a national level, it merely shipped 
them overseas to a country eager to industrialize. Government announcements of reduced 
emissions are commendable, but what do they matter when overall cumulative emissions remain 
the same?  
Isolated and decontextualized, the avalanches in the Aru mountain range are just 
abnormal geological events and the transfer of German steel conglomerates to China is just good 
business policy. These examples stress two key features of the environmental and economic 
world we live in. First, the avalanches in the Aru mountain range highlight that climate change is 
altering ecological processes and systems. Analytic and scientific studies reveal that economic 
production and consumption processes do not simply overshoot the Earth’s regenerative 
capacity, but they have also contributed to anthropogenic changes to the climate. If 
intergovernmental institutions, governments, and multinational corporations do not take aligned 
steps to combat current and future environmental disruption, more people around the globe will 
suffer fates similar to the villagers in Tibet.  
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Second, environmental awareness and economic undertakings are inseparable. Over the 
decades, media outlets, politicians, and activists have yanked social consciousness and public 
policy back and forth between the poles of environmental protectionism and economic 
development. This study expands upon research that attempts to merge these goals into one. 
A study of neoclassical economics presents a slew of market failures to investigate. A 
well-known example of market failure is the Great Depression. The Great Depression wreaked 
havoc on the economic and social spheres of the United States and countries connected to this 
economic powerhouse. Was this economic downturn a sleight of the invisible hand? If the Great 
Depression’s effects were not devastating enough, the capitalistic myth rolled along unfettered 
and unmodified in form and content. It is no surprise then that the 2008 Great Recession—the 
worst economic downturn since its earlier, darker cousin—struck with vengeful force.  
Instead of mentioning market failures themselves, scholarship also cites failures within 
the markets. Commenting on the limitations of mainstream economics, economist Nicholas Stern 
(2008, 1) argues that the failure of standard economics to combat climate change is “the biggest 
market failure the world has seen.” Neoclassical economics, or business as usual (BAU), has 
failed to address the externality of pollution, the principal cause of anthropogenic climate 
change.  
On the question of how to combat climate change, neoclassical economists and 
economically conservative politicians have leaned towards adaptation and away from mitigation 
which would require heavy environmental protections and economic regulations. Policymakers 
argue that since populations have repeatedly adapted to climatic change and sociopolitical shocks 
over the ages, the world can adapt to future climate change. Alternatively, proponents of active 
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measures to mitigate climate change suggest carbon pricing through taxation and emissions 
trading. Neoclassical economists analyze the disadvantages and advantages of these common 
solutions with cost-benefit analyses. However, the limitations of neoclassical economics and its 
failure to address environmental externalities opens the door to alternative methodologies and 
policy prescriptions.  
Considering this context, the following foundational question demands to be answered: if 
standard economic theory has failed to mitigate the effects of climate change on a scale 
commensurate to the problem, what macro-level policy proposals can Austrian economics offer 
that will be feasible, efficient, and equitable? This foundational research question is the guiding 
tool for this study. However, to achieve the study’s outlined aims, research must answer and 
discuss the following sub-questions: 
● How sufficient is mainstream neoclassical economics for handling externalities 
related to climate change? 
● Why is the Austrian perspective useful in analyzing environmental externalities 
produced by the current economic system of production and consumption? 
● What are the stances concerning adaptation and mitigation policies? 
● What other options lie outside adaptation and mitigation? 
● Why has policy not adequately addressed climate change even amidst scientific 
findings and public outcry? 
This study sets out to investigate the usefulness of alternative economic perspectives to 
resolving climate change. There are three primary aims of this study: (1) to bridge the 
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interdisciplinary gap between economics and environmental issues, (2) to stress the importance 
of heterodox approaches to the field of economics, and (3) to construct feasible, efficient, and 
equitable adaptation and mitigation policy prescriptions for avoiding dangerous climate change. 
To accomplish these aforementioned aims research must accomplish the following 
objectives: 
● Discuss the relevant literature concerning initiated climate change policy 
● Explain mainstream economics sufficiency at addressing climate change 
● Evaluate the costs and benefits of the common solution: carbon pricing  
● Analyze the frameworks of Austrian economics  
● Formulate a set of adaptation and mitigation policies considering the heterodox 
approach to economics 
Over the past century, two separate and distinct camps stood firm. One camp studied the 
variety and complexity of human activity to answer the broadest questions in life: why are we 
here, what are we doing, and where are we going? The other camp studied non-human activity to 
answer the same questions through a different lens. These two camps, despite the 
interconnectedness of its questions, ignored the existence of the other as if they could ever be 
mutually exclusive. Fortunately, the last three decades have seen a growing trend towards 
collaboration. 
Researchers have conducted many studies incorporating environmental and economic 
issues into a comprehensive whole. The outstanding literature attempts to produce cost-benefit 
analyses of possible solutions. Due to deep uncertainty embedded into climate change, the 
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outstanding literature is incomplete. Not one piece of literature uses alternative economic 
perspectives.  
Perhaps no single field of study uses the knowledge of as many disciplines as that of 
climate change. From math and forestry to religion and public policy, a study of climate change 
requires a liberal education in both thought and practice. Liberal education creates the open-
ended, holistic search for knowledge to answer one of life’s most pressing questions: how should 
humanity steward the planet? Though environmental studies is disinterested, it is not 
dispassionate as liberal studies aims to create conscientious and global citizens who realize that 
knowledge for its own sake is wonderful, but knowledge for ameliorative action is even more 
virtuous. 
The complexity of such a multi-dimensional problem constitutes an interdisciplinary 
approach. To measure and record the Earth’s functions, researchers need all the heavy 
sciences—physics, chemistry, and biology. To know how humanity affects the Earth, studies 
require derivatives of the hard sciences including forestry, marine biology, zoology, mineralogy, 
meteorology, and countless others. The full deployment of the social sciences and humanities 
from psychology and law to religion and classical studies is needed to understand why humans 
affect the Earth in the ways that they do and how to alter behavior. 
Like all studies, this one too has limitations. By combining research and concepts from 
economics and environmental studies, not in equal measure but in an equitable measure, this 
study attempts to be as interdisciplinary as possible. This study excludes the humanities, the hard 
sciences, and many social sciences. The conscientious inclusion of some disciplines at the 
exclusion of others presents yet another reason why this project is necessary: to fill the existing 
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gap in knowledge so that other researchers can climb upon its shoulders, view further into the 
uncertain future, and move humanity into it with confidence and courage. 
This chapter provides an introduction to the following study and describes the contents of 
this project. Chapter 2: “Methodology” lists conjectures and restates the study’s exploratory 
question. This chapter details the qualitative research design used. Furthermore, this section 
examines collected information and sources.  
Chapter 3: “Literature Review” provides background information on climate change and 
adaptation and mitigation policies. Next, it reviews carbon pricing through taxation and 
emissions trading. Lastly, it summarizes the literature on Austrian economics. Only by 
understanding where we have been and where we are, can we move forward. 
Chapter 4: “Findings” provides an objective, factual, and concise restatement of the 
study's findings.  
Chapter 5: “Discussion” summarizes and justifies the prescribed policy for adapting to 
and mitigating climate change considering the Austrian approach. Within this section, all policy 
prescription are presented with balanced evidence and support.   
Chapter 6: “Conclusion” provides a synopsis of the study and the prescribed climate 
change policy. Next, it appraises the study to reveal limitations and delimitations. Then, this 
section presents avenues for further research. This chapter ends with a call to action and an 
appeal to individual agency.  
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Chapter 2 Methodology 
 
Though knowledge of climate change is not new, international focus has only been on 
issues regarding climate change since the late 1970s. After the social and civil upheaval that 
accompanied the civil rights movement, worker’s liberation, and the sexual revolution, issues of 
climate change pushed to the forefront of social consciousness. Since the late 1970s, research 
correlating carbon and observed global temperature increases found that the atmospheric 
concentrations of GHG emissions have reached levels of concern (Allen et al. 2009; Anderson & 
Bows 2011; Matthews & Caldeira 2008; Solomon et al. 2009). A growing body of literature 
recognizes that that climate change is anthropogenic (Hansen et al. 2008; IPCC 2001; IPCC 
2007; IPCC 2014). Natural forcings of temperature are not to blame; climate change is a human 
problem with a human cause. Besides gaining international and political recognition of the 
weight of the climate change crisis, one of the main obstacles in dealing with such an 
international problem is creating comprehensive policy and solutions. 
It is a fundamental truth that without the natural environment, human systems—not to 
mention humans—would not exist. Reason and reality prove that the economic system cannot 
exist without the natural system (Adelson et al. 2008; Plater et al. 2008; Van den Berg 2012d). 
When designing climate change policy, economics must come into play. Economics plays an 
important role in creating feasible, efficient, and equitable climate change policy. There is an 
urgent need to assess the validity of using only one tool to address a multidimensional problem. 
A much-debated question is the role of neoclassical economics in the creation and solution of the 
climate change crisis.  
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 Up to now, research has paid far too little attention to the field of heterodox economics 
in relation to environmental issues. Previous studies of Austrian economics have not dealt with 
the difficulties and limitations of climate change policy deduced from Austrian economic 
principles (Cordato 2004; Dawson 2011; Dawson 2013; Dolan 2014; Regan 2015). Thus, this 
paper discusses the contributions of Austrian economics in creating climate change policy that 
considers economic development, environmental protection, and social equity. The following 
exploratory, or sub-questions, guided both the research for this study and the organization of the 
paper:  
  
•      How sufficient is mainstream neoclassical economics for handling externalities 
related to climate change? 
•      Why is the Austrian perspective useful in analyzing environmental externalities 
produced by the current economic system of production and consumption? 
•      What are the stances on adaptation and mitigation policies? 
•      What other options lie outside adaptation and mitigation? 
•      Why has policy not adequately addressed climate change even amidst scientific 
findings and public outcry?  
  
The main reason for choosing the topic of alternative economic perspectives was personal 
interest. Interested in alternative economic policy grew after taking a course that examined 
several heterodox economic schools of thought. Realizing that theory must stand trial, I focused 
this study on one issue: climate change. As this paper is listed underneath the department of 
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International Relations, this study is fitting. Being such a broad issue requiring deep knowledge 
of the economic structures within and among states, the nature of political life across national 
boundaries, and cross-cultural proficiency, climate change seemed a more than fitting topic of 
investigation. 
Given the selection of such a polemic topic, any biases related to the topic should be 
divulged upfront. Climate change is not a problem; it is a crisis. Further denial is not an option. 
Not only is denial no longer a choice, but denial puts all of humanity at risk. With that given, is 
is imperative that the global community collectively addresses climate change. Policymakers 
should give LDCs and developing countries equal consideration in discussions and forming 
policy as they will be the first affected though they contributed the least to the crisis. All personal 
biases against orthodox economics and in favor of heterodox economics were removed from the 
study. Thus, the “Discussion” chapter of this study attempted to be balanced, fair, and justified in 
its critique of the proposed policies.  
In terms of methodological framework, this investigation used a heterodox framework for 
two reasons: (1) it justified the interdisciplinary basis of this study in economics and climate 
change and (2) it justified the analysis of multiple economic perspectives. The heterodox 
framework is realistic and pragmatic. The realism of the heterodox framework is exemplified in 
the notion that environmental concerns must be situated inside a political economy (Adelson et 
al. 2008; Plater et al. 2008). The orthodox approach excluded the environmental and societal 
sphere of human activity. Adelson et al.’s (2008, 140) research also supports the notion that 
sustainable development rests upon a “three-legged stool.” This is why international justice is an 
environmental issue, why environmental degradation is an economic issue, why economic 
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growth is a social issue. This project will attempt to keep the study of alternative economic 
approaches to climate change centered within in this socio-environmental economic framework. 
Second, the heterodox framework justified the analysis of multiple economic schools of 
thought. The heterodox approach justified using multiple perspectives by granting “freedom in 
choosing models, interpretations, and issues to work with” (Van den Berg 2012b, 43). The 
orthodox framework is one tool within economic theory. Using a wide variety of tools can help 
researchers uncover more knowledge. 
Many researchers have used a quantitative cost-benefit analysis to measure the 
effectiveness of economic policy (Fankhauser 1996; Maddison 1995; Stern 2007; Stern 2008; 
Tol 2002). A quantitative cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of the policy approaches to climate change 
in relation to the heterodox schools of thought, Austrian economics, may require more space than 
this paper provides. The two primary disadvantages of CBA are that the CBA of climate change 
policy falls back into the rigidity of orthodox economics and that climate change is teeming with 
uncertainty. It is widely known that neoclassical economics relies on mathematical formalism. 
Thus, it seemed internally invalid to use a method that this project sought to critique and improve 
(Azar and Lindgren 2003; Van den Bergh 2004). Second, it is also known that climate change is 
full of uncertainties—uncertainties surrounding the climate systems sensitivity, the social cost of 
carbon, the precise rate at which climates may change, and the future predictions of social, 
political, and economic institutions (Lind 1995; Murphy et al. 2004; Stainforth et al. 2005; Tol 
2003). In sum, at the outset of this project, a CBA seemed both internally invalid and 
impractical.  
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The chosen method of analysis for this project was qualitative. The qualitative approach 
to this paper practiced heterodoxy through and through by giving primacy to verbal reasoning 
and internal consistency. Qualitative methods allowed for verbal reasoning and internal 
consistency necessary to this project’s method due to its subject matter. One of the objectives of 
this project was to take theoretical research and craft practical policy. The conclusions of this 
project will be prescriptive. To expand, the policy prescriptions of this paper will be international 
as climate change is a malaise that affects all nations. Until these policies, or similar policies, are 
initiated, there can be no singular, verified, and agreed upon truth to the policy prescriptions. 
This is why internal consistency and verbal reasoning, or a qualitative approach, was crucial. In 
sum, a qualitative methodology fully captured the complexities of the climate change crisis.  
As per the research strategy, this project referenced a wide variety of sources such as 
institutionally produced conference reports and datasets, books, peer-reviewed journals, 
magazine articles, and websites. All sources were selected based on their reliability and the 
credentials of the authors and institutions. Thus, this investigation asserts a high confidence in 
the credibility and reliability of the sources cited.  
The first step in this investigation was to formulate the criteria for analysis. Creation of 
the policy criteria attempted to its best efforts to align to the three-legged stool of sustainable 
development (Adelson et al. 2008). Forming the criteria at the onset of the investigation was a 
crucial step as it helped to eliminate researcher bias. If the results of the study were delineated 
and then the criteria were formed, the findings and conclusions of this study may have confirmed 
either intentionally or unintentionally to the criteria. Hence, a criterion is crucial to reliable 
conclusions.  
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To evaluate climate change policy, this study used the following criteria: feasibility, 
efficiency, and equity. This threefold criterion is related to the “three-legged” stool of sustainable 
development and the three spheres of human activity (Adelson et al. 2008; Van den Berg 2012a). 
Feasibility relates to economic growth. This study held the assumption that economic systems 
are evolutionary. Thus, instantaneous devolution or evolution of economic systems and 
processes is not feasible. Though policy may affect economic growth to some extent, a policy 
that might entail the complete reversal of economic evolution or that might entail a market 
collapse is not feasible. Therefore, a policy is feasible if, theoretically and pragmatically, it 
protects economic development with little to no economic disadvantages or risk of economic 
collapse.  
Efficiency relates to sustainable development, environmental protection in general and 
reducing carbon emissions in particular. It should go without saying that a policy is not efficient 
if it does not reasonably address the problem it set out to solve. Taking into consideration the 
other two criteria, a policy is efficient if, theoretically and pragmatically, it results in a reduction 
of GHG emissions commensurate to the problem.  
Last, equity relates to social equity and international justice. This study held the 
assumption that the natural, social, and economic spheres are interconnected. Thus, an 
environmental policy that respected economic development and reduced GHG emissions but 
neglected issues of international justice was not enough. Therefore, a policy is fair if, 
theoretically and pragmatically, it gives due consideration to emitters, non-emitters, developed 
countries, and developing countries alike (Büchs et al. 2011; Ciplet et al. 2013; Liu et al. 2017). 
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After the creation of the policy criteria, proposed climate change policy was deduced 
from the economic principles of the chosen school of thought. Once the proposed policy was 
deduced from the economic principles of the chosen school, the policy was analyzed with the 
aforementioned criteria. This study also recognized that other criteria will give rise to other 
conclusions and policy suggestions. This is another reason it was necessary to explain the criteria 
of analysis. The “Discussion” chapter will discuss in full the proposed economic policies. In the 
next chapter, this study will present a review of literature.  
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
 
Since the 1970s, the scientific community has informed governments of past, present, and 
future effects of GHGs. Though policy may disagree, the science concerning climate change is 
unequivocal. The outstanding literature is thorough, unmistakable, and disconcerting. Much of 
the current literature pays attention to investigating the anthropogenic effect on climate change 
(Allen et al. 2009; Arrow et al. 1995; IPCC 2013; Lynas 2008; Solomon 2009; Stern 2008; 
Wackernagel 1999; Wackernagel et al. 2002). The science is clear. The existing body of research 
has established that human activity, not natural ecological processes, is the principal cause of 
climate change. Though the body of literature is immense, it can be distilled into a few broad 
statements and contentions about what is happening to the climate and what measures should we 
take.  
Data from several studies have confirmed that the environmental system is exhaustible 
and climate-change is our problem. Humanity’s ecological footprint (EF) shows that economic 
production and consumption has reached levels incompatible with the Earth’s regenerative 
capacity (Wackernagel 1999; Wackernagel et al. 2002). Carbon emissions have been a major 
area of interest within the study of climate change because they provide enough information to 
compare countries and construct policy. Thus far, several studies and research have revealed a 
correlation between carbon emissions and global temperature (Allen et al. 2009; Kerr 2004; 
Lynas 2007; Pittock 2005; Stern 2007; Stern 2008). Though 2° does not sound like a large 
increase in temperature, in Earth’s delicate ecosystems, the literature suggests that 2° would be 
devastating. 
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Since the First Climate Conference in 1979, numerous reports, conferences, and policies 
have been created to avoid the consequences of dangerous climate change. Climate change 
knowledge, history, and policy can be categorized as follows: reports, parties and party 
groupings, and policies and protocols. Since its establishment in 1988 by the WMO and UNEP, 
the IPCC has led the academic community in climate change research and discussion (Gupta 
2010). In total, the IPCC has published five lengthy assessment reports that deal with the 
physical evidence for anthropogenic climate change, assessment of adaption and vulnerability, 
options for mitigation, the social effects of climate change, and other numerous special topics. 
Research has revealed that the intergovernmental community in relation to climate change is 
organized generally along developed-developing lines. The most well-known climate change 
policy is the Kyoto Protocol that attempts to limit the carbon emissions of Annex I countries. 
The literature review will more thoroughly address the above-summarized points. 
Last, but not least, the literature review will highlight the history of the Austrian school 
of economics in relation to neoclassical economics. Next, the literature review will examine the 
contentions and disagreement with neoclassical economic applications to climate change from an 
Austrian perspective. The review of literature will also analyze the overarching economic 
principles and methodologies that constitute this school. In Chapter 5 “Discussion”, this  
alternative economic policy will be discussed and analyzed in detail to contribute to the creation 
of feasible, efficient, and equitable adaptation and mitigation policy.  
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Limits and Effects of Human Activity on the Planet 
The Ecological Footprint (EF) 
 
First, the environmental system is exhaustible. To date, several studies have attempted to 
evaluate the impact of human activity on the planet through various analytical models (Arrow et 
al. 1995; Wackernagel 1999; Wackernagel et al. 2002). The study by Wackernagel et al. (2002) 
offers probably the most comprehensive empirical tool for revealing the magnitude of human 
production and consumption. In their study, Wackernagel et. al (2002) developed an analytical 
framework to measure and track the ecological overshoot of production and consumption 
processes. The ecological footprint (EF) is an analytical tool that compares “the annual demand 
on nature with nature’s regenerative capacity” (Wackernagel et al. 1999, 2). The EF reveals that 
the global economic system of production and consumption, guided by neoclassical principles, 
cannot continue to exist within a bounded ecological system.  
In 1961, at the beginning of the United States’s consumerist ideology, global economic 
production operated at 70% of the Earth’s regenerative capacity (Wackernagel et al. 2002, 9266). 
By 1999, all economic processes exceeded Earth’s regenerative capacity by 20% (Wackernagel 
et al. 2002, 9266). As Wackernagel et al. describe, “In other words, 20% overshoot means that it 
would require 1.2 earths, or one earth for 1.2 years, to regenerate what humanity used in 1999” 
(2002, 9268). The results show that global production and consumption is unsustainable.  
Though intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations use the EF, it has its 
critics. Previous research has established that the EF has several fundamental problems (Arrow et 
al. 1995; Ayres 2000; Fiala 2008; Van den Bergh & Verbruggen 1999). The key critiques of the 
EF may be divided into three categories: evolutionary processes, land degradation, and 
emissions. The EF does not acknowledge that evolutionary processes such as technological 
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development and biological mutation can affect the Earth’s ecological capacity. Neither land 
degradation nor sustainable land use is factored into the EF’s methodology. The EF fails to 
delineate the effects of GHG emissions on ecological capacity. Thematically, elaborations on the 
main critiques of the EF are as follows.  
First and foremost, one criticism of the EF is that its methodology excludes important 
factors such as technological development and biological diversification which may vary 
ecological capacity. Technological development can influence ecological capacity as processes 
requiring natural resources become more sustainable, but the EF has no way of evaluating and 
including these technologies (Arrow et al. 1995, 520; Fiala 2008, 521). Thus, the EF between 
consecutive years are not adequately comparable because they fail to account for the 
technological developments that may have affected the ecological capacity of the planet. 
Furthermore, Arrow et al. (1995) acknowledged that the EF fails to consider the effect of 
evolutionary change on ecological capacity. Commenting on the EF’s limitations, Arrow et al. 
argue that the EF is methodologically flawed because the “consequences of human innovation 
and biological evolution are inherently unknowable” (1995, 521). Without addressing changes in 
biological diversity, the EF does not provide an accurate measure of the Earth’s regenerative 
capacity. Like technological development, biological mutation is to some degree a near 
spontaneous and evolutionary process that researchers can only predict with little certainty 
(Arrow et al. 1995). For example, species vary in productive capacity over the years as well as 
adapt and mutate. If these variations are not held constant, or if no proportionate measurement is 
created, researchers cannot accurately compare the EF across years.  
Second, Fiala (2008) and Van den Bergh and Verbruggen (1999) agree that the EF is too 
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static a measurement because it does not properly address land degradation. Reason maintains 
that if the rate of land degradation increases, ecosystems and natural resources become more 
limited. Thus, humanity’s ecological overshoot will increasingly exceed the Earth’s regenerative 
capacity. Unsurprisingly, the initial EF in 1961 did not alarm policymakers because they were 
uninformed of the underlying land degradation and compounding environmental factors that 
caused this number to skyrocket in the following decades. Furthermore, Fiala (2008) and Van 
den Bergh and Verbruggen (1999) mentioned that the EF does not differentiate between 
sustainable land use and unsustainable land use, a factor that would affect the Earth’s ecological 
capacity.  
Lastly, Fiala (2008) criticized the EF because it does not include a measure of GHG 
emissions. The EF stays true to its name; it is very much a footprint. The EF incorporates land 
use—water and earth—while excluding other ways to evaluate humanity’s effect on the planet. 
By neglecting GHG emissions, the EF cannot accurately assess the totality of anthropogenic 
environmental degradation nor its interrelations.  
In summary, a review of the aforementioned literature has shown that the EF is helpful 
but incomplete in comparing the unsustainable rate of economic processes with Earth’s 
regenerative and absorptive capacities. Moreover, the outstanding literature up to this point also 
provides fundamental critiques of the EF. The EF attempts to calculate global economic 
production and consumption in relation to environmental capacity ceteris paribus.3 However, 
those ‘other things’ are crucial to adequate and thorough calculations. Ayres also observes, 
“What the EF does not provide, however, is a meaningful rank-ordering of countries. Still less 
does it have any value for policy evaluation or planning purposes” (2000, 349). To overcome the 
                                                 
3 Ceteris paribus is Latin for “all other things being equal.”   
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EF’s limitations, researchers, environmentalists, and policymakers have consulted data regarding 
carbon emissions. 
 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions 
 
The data surrounding carbon emission is harder to contend with. There is a consensus 
among scientists that the effects of human activity on the planet are dreadful at best and 
disastrous at worst. Since the beginning of the pre-industrial period, human activity has 
inundated the atmosphere with GHG emissions, specifically carbon dioxide, from reliance on 
coal and oil energy. The 2013 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change stated that “carbon 
dioxide concentrations have increased by 40% since pre-industrial times, primarily from fossil 
fuel emissions (11). Carbon emissions have been a major area of interest within the study of 
climate change because they provide enough information to compare countries and construct 
policy. 
In two separate studies by Allen et al. (2009) and Solomon et. al (2009) found that the 
some of the effects of GHG emissions are irreversible. The literature surrounding climate change 
suggests that unless immediate action is taken, at some point in the future GHG emissions will 
reach a turning point at which no amount of mitigation or reduction will stop the effects (Ayres 
2000, 349). Models currently indicate that even if all carbon emissions were to commence 
immediately, global average temperatures would still continue to rise and then “remain 
approximately constant despite zero further emissions” (Solomon 2009, 1705). In other words, 
the increases in the number and magnitude of natural disasters and tragedies like the ones that 
occurred in the Aru mountain range are the result of our past actions. Imagine the natural 
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disasters, the rise in sea level, and the species extinctions due to carbon emissions we have 
already induced due to our past and current actions.  
Thus far, several studies and research have revealed a correlation between carbon 
emissions and global temperature (Allen et al. 2009; Kerr 2004; Lynas 2007; Pittock 2005; Stern 
2008). In an investigation into carbon emissions and global temperature increases, Allen et al. 
(2009, 1163) found that at one trillion ton of carbon emissions—roughly 3.67 trillion tons of 
CO2—the planet will experience a collective 2°C warming. As a species bent on ecological 
domination, overproduction, and overconsumption, we had already emitted half of that by 2009 
(Allen et al. 2009, 1163). 
Though models consistently correlate carbon dioxide emissions with temperature rises, 
these models do not agree on exactly how much warming is expected. In 2001, the IPCC 
predicted that twice the current CO2 concentrations could raise temperatures 1.5° to 4.5°C 
(Pittock 2005, 153). One study authored by Murphy et al. (2004, 770) under the guidance of the 
Hadley Center for Climate Prediction and Research reported with 95% confidence global 
temperature in the range of 2.4 to 5.4°C. In other words, the research by Murphy et al. (2004) 
predicted that if concentrations of CO2 doubled, there was only a one in twenty chance that 
temperatures would be below or above this range (Pittock 2005, 153). 
However, University of Oxford scientist David Stainforth, a collaborator on the Murphy 
et al. (2004) study, attempted to circumvent anecdotal evidence that researchers tailor their 
models based on already existing models, creating closed loops of similar data inputs and results. 
In this controversial study, Stainforth et al. (2005, 403) found using aggregate models that an 
increase in global temperature due to doubled CO2 concentrations could lie between 1.9° to 
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11.5°C, well outside the IPCC predictions. The studies reviewed here and the outstanding 
literature on climate change suggest a positive correlation between CO2 emissions and 
temperature. However, such studies clearly indicate that the uncertainties embedded in the 
climate system make finding a singular model difficult for scientists. 
What is known about carbon emissions and future global temperature increases is largely 
based on aggregate computer models. For that reason, much of the previous research on climate 
change has been quantitative in nature. Drawing on an extensive body of quantitative research, 
Six Degrees: Our Future on A Hotter Planet by Mark Lynas (2008) paints an alarming picture of 
a 2°C rise in temperature. In an article summarizing the key claims of Six Degrees, Lynas (2007) 
describes what a 2°C temperature might look like: 
 
The oceans may become the new deserts as the world’s temperatures reach 2°C above 
today’s . . . . Two degrees may not sound like much, but it is enough to make every 
European summer as hot as 2003 when 30,000 people died from heatstroke . . . . Two 
degrees is also enough to cause the eventual complete melting of the Greenland ice sheet, 
which would raise global sea levels by seven meters . . . . The impacts of two degrees 
warming are bad enough, but far worse is in store if emissions continue to rise.  
 
Though 2° does not sound like a large increase in temperature, in Earth’s delicate ecosystems, 
the literature suggests that 2° would be devastating. 
In view of all that has been mentioned so far, CO2 emissions currently provide the most 
accurate measure of humanity’s effect on the planet. The literature surrounding climate change 
suggests that, given the delayed effects of the ecosystem, warming that has already occurred is 
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irreversible. Furthermore, if governments and institutions do not take immediate action, at some 
point in the future GHG emissions will reach a turning point at which no amount of mitigation 
will stop the effects. The literature correlating CO2 emissions to global temperature increases is 
limited by uncertainty and, at this point in time, can only provide a wide range of temperatures 
and probabilities. Last, data on CO2 emissions is beneficial to creating a rank-ordering of nations 
and to constructing policy to reduce the possibility of dangerous warming.  
 
The History of Climate Change Policy 
  
Since the First World Climate Conference in 1979, numerous reports, conferences, and 
policies have been created to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. What follows is a 
brief account of the history of climate change policy. Due to the overwhelming amount of 
information produced by intergovernmental bodies, national bodies, and NGOs relating to 
climate change, only the most foundational and key milestones are presented. The history of 
climate change policy may be classified based on content and purpose into three main categories: 
reports, parties and party groupings, and policies and protocols.    
 
Reports 
 
In 1987, the UN held the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED), also known as the Brundtland Commission (WCED 2008, 138). Within its report, Our 
Common Future, the WCED defined sustainable development as “achieving our own goals 
without impeding those of other future generations” (2008, 138). In summary, this report focused 
broadly on the role of the international economy in creating sustainable development, the 
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potential of food scarcity and subsequent security risks, extinction patterns of species, and the 
need to invest in cleaner sources of energy (WCED 1987). 
In the case of climate change research, the IPCC has led the way in providing 
collaborative and thorough research on the science, future implications, and possible responses. 
A year after the WCED report, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) established the IPCC (Gupta 2010, 637). With the 
establishment of the IPCC, research on climate change was institutionalized, centralized, and 
produced by an internationally recognized body. The major IPCC reports were published in 
1990, 1995, 2001, 2007, and 2014. What follows is a brief, chronological description of the 
major themes and discoveries of each IPCC report. 
In 1990, the IPCC FAR define the scope of climate change, provided initial definitions, 
and established common ground for scientists and policymakers to build on. In the IPCC FAR 
SYR, the contributors felt “certain” that “emissions resulting from human activities are 
substantially increasing the atmosphere concentration of the greenhouse gases” (52). This IPCC 
report also predicted increase temperatures and sea level rises due to this increase in the 
concentration of greenhouse gasses (52). In response to climate change, the IPCC FAR (1990) 
described a breadth of strategies including, but not limited to, the expansion of technologies, new 
monitoring systems, reducing emissions, and increased cooperation between developing and 
developed nations. 
In 1995, the IPCC SAR focused on the scientific basis of anthropogenic climate change, 
seminal discussions of adaptation and mitigation, and the economic and social dimensions of 
climate change. Using careful and precise language, the IPCC SPM stated that “the balance of 
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evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate” (22). 
Furthermore, this report expanded its section on adaptation and mitigation by focusing on key 
industries that could easily be adapted to climate change such as “energy, industry, 
residential/commercial, and agricultural/forestry” (36). Lastly, this report also investigated how 
to deal with the economic costs of climate change in the face of such limited knowledge. In 
response to such uncertainty, the IPCC replied as follows: “The challenge is not to find the best 
policy today for the next 100 years, but to select a prudent strategy and to adjust it over time in 
light of new information” (45). 
The organization and focus of the 2001 IPCC TAR reflected the shift in current literature. 
Whereas the report of 1995 addressed adaptation and mitigation together, the 2001 IPCC TAR 
recognized the importance of giving adaptation and mitigation their equal value in addressing 
climate change. For that purpose, this report set the model for the following two reports, focusing 
on the advances in the scientific understanding of anthropogenic climate change, issues of 
vulnerability within adaptation, and options for mitigation. In regards to anthropogenic climate 
change, the 2001 IPCC SPM stated, “There is new and stronger evidence that most of the 
warming observed over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities” (5). Furthermore, 
this report presented adaptation as a necessity and not an option (23). Lastly, this report offered 
“a portfolio of policy instruments” for mitigating climate change, but also mentioned the 
“technical, economic, political, cultural, social, behavioral, and/or institutional barriers that 
prevent the full exploitation of technological, economic, and social opportunities of these 
options” (24). By the publication of the 2001 IPCC TAR, the scientific community had found 
strong evidence for anthropogenic climate change, had presented adaptation and mitigation as 
policy options, and had uncovered that several options were available to address the problem. 
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         At this point in the review of IPCC Assessment Reports, the 2007 and 2014 reports can 
be lumped together as the findings of the 2001 IPCC TAR were improved on and expanded. In 
the 2007 and 2014 IPCC Assessment Reports, the evidence for anthropogenic climate change 
increased in certainty. By 2007, the IPCC SYR expressed “very high confidence” in the effect of 
human activities on warming (37). By 2014, the warming was “unequivocal” (IPCC 2014, 40). 
With increasing specificity, the IPCC AR4 and IPCC AR5 addressed a wide range of adaptation 
and mitigation strategies in multiple sectors for reducing climate change.  
 
Parties and Party Groupings 
 
Under the UNFCCC and throughout the literature on climate change policy, countries are 
referred to by three main groupings that categorize industrialized and developing nations. As 
categorized by the UNFCCC, these main groups are Annex 1, Annex II, and Non-Annex I 
countries (UNFCCC 2017b). The Annex I country grouping is comprised of the original nations 
in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992 (UNFCCC 
2017b). Annex I countries also include countries with economies in transition (EIT) to the 
industrialized state. Also included in the Annex I grouping are the Baltic States and some post-
Soviet Union Republics. To see a complete list of Annex I countries and a list of countries with 
EITs, refer to Appendices A and B respectively. 
         Annex II includes OECD countries, but not EIT parties. As prescribed by the UNFCCC, 
Annex II countries are responsible for providing funding to developed countries as well as 
facilitate the equitable transfer of technologies and information. Those in the Annex II grouping 
must take all possible measures to adapt and mitigate climate change so as to alleviate the 
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pressure on Non-Annex I countries (UNFCCC 2017b. To see a complete list of Annex II 
countries, refer to Appendix C. 
         Lastly, Non-Annex I countries included developing countries that are “especially 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (UNFCCC 2017b. 
         However, the three main groupings created by the UNFCCC are more so related to who 
gives and who receives funding. Within these categories of industrialized and developing 
nations, there are also regional groupings of countries with similar self-interests (UNFCCC 
2017c. Within the developed nation cohort, the following country groupings meet collectively to 
discuss climate change as it refers to their own self-interests: the EU, the Umbrella Group,—a 
“loose coalition of non-EU developed countries”— and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) countries (UNFCCC 2017c. To see a complete list of the countries in the 
grouping, refer to Appendices E, F, and G respectively. 
         Due to their specific positions as developing, non-culpable, and vulnerable countries, 
Annex II countries and EITs have also developed their own party groupings. The main groupings 
of developed countries include the G-77, the African States, the Small Island Developing States 
(SIDS), and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) (UNFCCC 2017c. To see a complete list of 
these four party groupings, refer to Appendices H, I, J, and K respectively. 
 
Policies and Protocols 
 
Though there have been numerous conferences, conventions, policies, and protocols 
related to climate change, two of these are most important in past and current literature. There is 
no doubt that these two international agreements, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, will 
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continue to be important to the literature of climate change and to policy. For that purpose, the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are reviewed in this section. 
         The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) provides the 
foundational principles that were used in subsequent climate change discussions and 
international policies. The UNFCCC, created in 1992, is one of three Rio Conventions. In the 
same year, the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro included the UNFCCC, UN Convention on 
Biological Diversity, and the Convention to Combat Desertification (UNFCCC 2017a). The 
UNFCCC entered force in 1994 and currently has 197 members (UNFCCC 2017a). Per the 
UNFCCC (UNFCCC 2017a), the six aims of the Convention are as follows: (1) recognize that 
climate change was a problem even in the face of scientific uncertainty, (2) stabilize GHG 
emissions at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change, (3) compel 
Annex I countries to reduce their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, (4) direct funds and 
technology to developing countries, (5) increase country reporting and accountability, (6) 
acknowledge the increasingly important role of adaptation to discussions of climate change. 
         If the UNFCCC is the bark, then the Kyoto Protocol is the bite. At the COP-3 the Kyoto 
Protocol was drafted (Gupta 2010, 639). A year later signatories of the UNFCCC realized that to 
meet such a lofty goal and address climate change properly, they would need to implement a 
stronger protocol. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol created “stricter demands” than the UNFCCC 
(UNFCCC 2017a). It put quantitative numbers and “mandatory targets” to the UNFCCC’s main 
aim of stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change 
(UNFCCC 2017a). Furthermore, following the lead from the IPCC AR4 and AR5, the Kyoto 
Protocol includes “a menu of policies and measures” to meet GHG emissions targets from which 
countries can select (Gupta 2010, 643). As of this writing, the United States is a signatory of the 
  
 
 
29 
Protocol but has not yet ratified. In regards to Canada, she withdrew from the Protocol in 
December 2012 (UNFCCC 2017d). 
 
Adaptation Policy 
 
When it comes to the topic of climate change, most researchers will readily agree that 
something needs to be done. Where this agreement usually ends, however, is on the question of 
what should be done. Whereas some are convinced that adaptation is the best route to combat 
climate change, others maintain that mitigation strategies are our only hope. Pittock, a leading 
atmospheric scientist, argues that we’re going to need as much adaptation as possible to combat 
already emitted GHG emissions (Pittock 2005, 150). After providing and discussing proposed 
definitions of adaptation in the current literature, this section will present the pertinent literature 
regarding some of the key economic environmental and institutional questions that Austrian and 
policy must address.   
 
Agreeing on a Precise Definition of Adaptation 
 
Like with most social and global problems, a lack of agreement on definitions lies at the 
root of climate change policy. Just as sustainable development remains elusive to those on both 
sides of the environmental and economic rift, so does adaptation. Adaptation does not escape the 
problem of definition. Adaptation’s vagueness in traditional discourse gives rise to multiple 
definitions. As defined by the IPCC Synthesis Report on Climate Change, adaptation is a set of 
adjustments in “natural and human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or 
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their effects” (IPCC 2001). This definition is useful because it was provided by an internationally 
recognized body. 
However, the definition of adaptation provided by the IPCC is problematic as it lacks the 
specificity necessary for having productive conversations around such a polemic topic as climate 
change. Thus, the definition of adaptation varies in the literature and there is terminological 
confusion (Adger et al. 2009; Adger et al. 2005). While a variety of definitions of the term 
adaptation have been suggested, this paper will use the definition suggested by Adger et al. 
(2009, 78) who defined it as “an adjustment in ecological, social, or economic systems in 
response to observed or expected changes in climatic stimuli and their effects and impacts in 
order to alleviate adverse impacts of change or take advantage of new opportunities [italics 
added].” Adger et al.’s (2009) definition of adaptation is more beneficial in discussions of 
climate change than the IPCC for two reasons. First, this definition addresses the triad system in 
which climate change occurs. Second, it expands the purpose of adaptation from purely 
preventative measures to ones that includes ameliorative measures as well.  
 
Creating Equity in Adaptation Policy  
 
Since adaptation does not occur within an economic and sociocultural vacuum, it must 
discuss the accompanying dimensional spillovers. Commenting on the social spillovers into 
discussions of adaptation, King (2004, 177) acknowledges that “issues of justice lie at the heart 
of the climate change mission.” Creating adaptation policy and addressing issues of justice 
involve their fair share of politicking. To borrow from the lay definition of politics by Harold 
Dwight Lasswell, equity focuses on answering the question of who gets what, when and how. 
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What follows is an account of how the outstanding literature on adaptation addresses these 
fundamental questions related to equity. 
In previous studies on equitable adaptation policy, researchers have acknowledged that 
the ‘who’ of this question refers to individual countries, particularly developing countries (Adger 
et al. 2005; Ciplet et al. 2013; King 2004). National governments are crucial to discussions of 
adaptation to climate change because no suprainternational authority exists that can enforce 
internationally agreed upon policy and protocols. Thus, national governments—with their 
varying self-interests—must take initiative and be held accountable for ratifying and 
implementing these policies. In research by Ciplet et al. (2013, 50) the concern that varying 
national interests will impede international consensus is termed the “The Wedge”. This concern 
is aptly named as the relationship between donors and recipients—specifically between 
developed countries and developing countries—drives a wedge between them that could hinder 
the creation of climate change policy (2013, 50). 
Furthermore, the literature on the inequalities in adaptation highlighted that not only must 
developing countries address the effects of climate change, effects that they had virtually no role 
in causing, but they will have to deal with these effects sooner than developed countries (Adger 
et al. 2005; Ciplet et al. 2013; King 2004). Developing countries bear the burden of managing a 
problem they did not create by using infrastructure and money they do not have. The ‘who’ 
component of the equity question also addresses the issue of assessing vulnerability and need 
(Ciplet et al. 2013). Which countries are most vulnerable to the effects of climate change? Which 
countries are most in need of financing? How do governments prioritize observed climatic 
changes such as famines and droughts with less immediate concerns such as predicted sea level 
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rise and temperature change? These are only some of the questions which a comprehensive 
adaptation framework must address. 
Any act of ‘getting’ requires an equal and opposite act of giving. Thus, several studies 
note that issues of equity with adaptation policy must also address the culpability and 
responsibility of developed nations (Adger et al. 2005; Ciplet et al. 2013; King 2004). The type 
and amount of monetary funding and financing provided by developed nations to developing 
nations answers ‘what’ is given. Though monetary funding and financing are key issues in 
adaptation policy, they should not be they only issues. Developed countries will need financing 
for infrastructural adjustments, but they could also benefit from the free and flowing exchange of 
technologies as well. 
Moreover, intergovernmental bodies must address the governance and deliverance of 
funds (Ciplet et al. 2013). Issues of equity are not solely embedded into assessments of which 
countries receive monetary funding for adaptation measures. Issues of equity are also embedded 
into the governance process. Should developed countries get to decide which developing 
countries are the most vulnerable or are most in need? Are the institutional bodies that govern 
these policies and funds structured in a way that is equitable to all or just the developed world? 
The deliverance of funds also highlights a key of ‘how’ these developed countries get funding 
and financing. Respectively, Cipet et al. (2013, 50) term these concerns “The Gap” (in funding) 
and the “The Dodge” (from institutional responsibility). 
Last and certainly not least, all research on climate change policy worth its spit 
emphasizes that the implementation of adaptation measures—as well as the whole issue of 
climate change—is time-dependent and -sensitive.  
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Mitigation Policy: Carbon Pricing 
 
In this study, I attempt to defend the view that heterodox perspectives to climate change 
policy provide useful theoretical and practical contributions to the field of economics. This paper 
discusses the feasibility, efficiency, and equity of proposed climate change policy from the 
Austrian school of economics. As previously stated, one of the main methods of mitigating 
climate change is through carbon pricing. What follows is a brief review of the literature 
concerning the primary neoclassical methodologies for mitigating climate change by establishing 
a carbon price. Before proceeding to examine methodologies of carbon pricing, it is important to 
first provide some context for these mitigation mechanisms.  
In the words of Joseph Stiglitz, the world is currently conducting a global experiment 
with catastrophic consequences (Stiglitz 2006b, 161). A wealth of scientific research has shown 
that increasing emissions of GHGs into the atmosphere have contributed to an increase in global 
observed temperatures (Allen et al. 2009; Kerr 2004; Lynas 2007; Pittock 2005; Stern 2007; 
Stern 2008). In a gradually heating bathtub, we would cook to death before we even noticed. The 
long-lived fable is playing out. Finally, we have realized that the water is warming, but we are 
still figuring out the best way to get out the tub.  
The need for carbon pricing arrives on the heels of the failure of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Though the Kyoto Protocol claims to be legally binding, studies have shown that the Kyoto 
Protocol has less bite than policymakers expected (Chang 2010; Finus 2008; Norhaus 2006; 
Nordhaus 2014). Research indicates that the channels for enforcement are rather weak. Thus, 
advocates and proponents of carbon pricing cite the failure of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce levels 
commensurate with the climate change crisis. Furthermore, proponents of the climate change 
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crisis also cite the failure of the Kyoto Protocol to secure and retain participation of key states. 
Stiglitz (2006b, 180) writes, “Kyoto was the natural approach to global warming. The problem: 
excessive emissions. The solution: reduce the emissions. But life is never so simple or easy.” 
Under the current commitment phase of the Kyoto Protocol, the United States, the second largest 
emitter of GHGs, is not under any emissions commitments (UNFCCC 2017d). Furthermore, 
though China is the largest emitter of GHGs, it is not given an emissions reduction target either 
because it is considered a developing country (UNFCCC 2017d). Canada, a large industrialized 
country, withdrew from the first commitment period with virtually no consequences (UNFCCC 
2017d).  
Much of the current literature on carbon pricing focuses on the nature of this free-rider 
problem (Nordhaus 2014; Stiglitz 2006a). Within the literature, economics suggests that though 
countries may feel concern about climate change and though they recognize the need to address 
the issues as soon as possible, they also have their own economic self-interests (Stiglitz 2006a; 
Stiglitz 2006b; Stiglitz 2010). Thus, countries do not want to commit to emissions reduction 
targets because it would disproportionately hurt their own economic self-interests if other 
countries also do not reduce their emissions. Thus, instead of voluntary commitments with little 
to no mechanisms for enforcement, market-based measures present an alternative solution to 
mitigating climate change.  
 Carbon pricing is a market-based mechanism used to mitigate climate change and 
encourage the investment in cleaner energies. Much of the literature on carbon pricing 
emphasizes one of two methodologies: carbon taxation or carbon trading (Arrow et al. 1997; 
Stiglitz 2006a; Stiglitz 2006b; Stiglitz 2010). Data from several studies suggest that advocates of 
carbon taxation argue that this market-based mechanism eliminates the need for country specific 
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reductions targets; opponents argue that the policy surrounding carbon taxation is hasty and 
haphazardly constructed. Nonetheless, most neoclassical economists are in favor of market-based 
approaches to mitigate climate change. The following excerpt is from a memo drafted by Arrow 
et al. (1997) and signed by twenty-five hundreds economists collectively expressing their stance 
towards carbon pricing: 
 
The most efficient approach to slowing climate change is through market-based policies. 
In order for the world to achieve its climatic objectives at minimum cost, a cooperative 
approach among nations is required—such as an international emissions trading 
agreement. The United States and other nations can most efficiently implement their 
climate policies through market mechanisms, such as carbon taxes or the auction of 
emissions permits. The revenues generated from such policies can effectively be used to 
reduce the deficit or to lower existing taxes.  
 
The following is a brief description of the stances towards carbon taxation found in the 
literature reviewed. 
Carbon taxation is frequently prescribed as a market-based policy for mitigating climate 
change and encouraging investment in cleaner energy. In the field of economics, carbon taxation 
has been instrumental in our understanding of Pigouvian taxes beyond theory.   
The literature on carbon pricings has highlighted several reasons why a carbon tax is the 
best and most efficient mechanism of reducing GHG emission and motivating investments in 
cleaner energies (Nordhaus 2014). Up to date, several studies have suggested that a carbon tax 
would eliminate the need for reductions underneath the Kyoto Protocol (Stiglitz 2006a; Stiglitz 
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2006b; Stiglitz 2010). The research has showed that the Kyoto Protocol currently has no 
mechanisms for enforcement and also leaves too much room for voluntary negotiations of 
reduced emissions target based on the countries own self-interest (Stiglitz 2006a; Stiglitz 2006b). 
This protocol fails because every country must negotiate its own emissions reduction. Thus, 
cumulative emissions flows must then be calculated as each country agrees to its own reduction 
target to keep the global cumulative emissions level below the annual target. The review of 
literature suggests that a carbon tax is an easier and more effective ways to reduce carbon 
emissions because it bypasses the need for arguments of self-interests. Regardless of self-
interest, emitters pay for what they emit.  
 A carbon tax effectively creates a market for carbon emissions where one does not exists. 
By calculating the social cost of carbon and then artificially imposing a price on carbon where 
one does not exist, a carbon tax uses a price mechanism to convey information about the 
marketplace. This price mechanism conveys to consumers and producers a signal to increase or 
decrease supply or demand. In the case of a carbon tax, a price on carbon emissions where there 
was none before would communicate the need to emit less carbon emissions if revenue is to be 
kept the same. In sum, it would communicate that carbon emissions are bad and to either be paid 
for or progressively reduced until the carbon tax does not apply as much to their production 
processes.  
 Thus, previous research has established that a market-based mechanism such as carbon 
taxation might coax industrialized and developed countries like the United States and Canada to 
participate (Stiglitz 2006a; Stiglitz 2006b; Stiglitz 2010). This research highlights that if there is 
overwhelming participation in a carbon tax, then industrialized and developed countries would 
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feel that their economic interests are no longer at a disadvantage compared to those countries 
who do not have emissions targets under the Kyoto Protocol.  
 Third, it has been suggested that a carbon tax mechanisms on carbon emissions is both 
practical and efficient because the price signal can be changed (Nordhaus 2014; Stiglitz 2006a; 
Stiglitz 2006b). As economists Joseph E. Stiglitz (2006a, 3) argues, “As technologies evolve, and 
the nature of the threat of global warming becomes clearer, the tax rate could adjust, perhaps up, 
perhaps down.” Economists suggest that something must be done to mitigate carbon emissions. 
Once a carbon price is set on carbon emissions, the price can then be increased or decreased as 
needed to convey information. Thus, in the time that it would take to create political and 
international pressure on countries that have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol and countries that 
have withdrawn, a carbon market can be created and adjusted accordingly.  
  The evidence reviewed here suggests that a major qualm with the Kyoto Protocol is the 
lack of enforcement mechanisms for countries that overshoot their targets or countries that 
withdraw from the protocol. Thus, the neoclassical market-based mechanisms of a carbon tax 
could remedy this limitation of the Kyoto Protocol. Economists have begun to examine the use 
of economic sanctions towards countries that have not initiated a carbon tax (Nordhaus 2014; 
Stiglitz 2006a; Triole 2008). The use of economic sanctions towards countries that have not 
initiated a carbon tax would transfer the economic disadvantage from countries with a carbon tax 
to high emitting countries. Thus, the United Sates and other developed countries would retain 
their economic advantage and not be penalized economically for helping to solve the climate 
crisis.  
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 On the other hand, despite recent findings about the role of carbon pricing in reducing 
GHG emissions, several studies have indicated that carbon taxation is not without its own 
limitations and drawbacks. Here many economists object that carbon taxation is unnecessary, 
puts developed countries at a disadvantage in trade, and posits unresolved questions. The 
following will address each of these claims individually. 
It has been suggested that carbon taxation is an unnecessary regulation because high 
energy prices will naturally do the job (Murphy et al. 2015). As stated above, carbon taxation is a 
price mechanism used to give information to producers and consumers about the nature of 
resources and goods. However, opponents of a carbon tax argue that these price mechanisms 
already exist in the form of oil prices and the prices of other energy sources. These critics of 
carbon taxation argue that energy prices on their own are already showing an increasing trend 
and these prices will dissuade emitters on their own. Opponents of the carbon taxation method of 
carbon pricing disagree with the artificial injection of prices into the marketplace. 
Opponents of carbon taxation also argue that a carbon tax would make countries with a 
carbon tax uncompetitive in the global trade system (Murphy et al. 2015). Some researchers have 
noted that implementation of a carbon tax might put countries with this policy at a disadvantage 
in terms of trade. A carbon tax would lead to an increase in production costs which would make 
goods costlier on the international market. Thus, these goods produced underneath an economic 
system with a carbon tax would be at an economic disadvantage on the market and might result 
in a decrease in profits.  
Last, the research suggests that critics of a carbon tax demonstrate that the 
implementation of a carbon tax is not without its own unresolved questions, just like the Kyoto 
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Protocol. The unresolved question related to the Kyoto Protocol was what mechanisms are in 
place to keep countries from reneging on their commitments. In terms of carbon taxation, critics 
argue that the carbon taxation mechanism also has its own unresolved question: what will happen 
to the revenue from taxation (Murphy et al. 2015)? Opponents of carbon taxation suggest that 
revenue from the carbon tax could be allocated towards investments in cleaner energies, given to 
developing countries to leap-frog energy intensity technologies, distributed amongst the 
population on a per capita basis, or substituted in place of other taxes such as income tax. The 
mechanism of carbon taxation is still in its infancy and there are numerous disputes over how to 
best manage the revenues from the taxes. 
To conclude this section, the literature identifies that carbon taxation is one of the main 
neoclassical market-based mechanisms for mitigating climate change and increasing investment 
in cleaner energies. In summary, though the neoclassical market-based mechanisms are 
promising, opponents of a carbon tax raise considerable arguments.  
 
The Economics of Climate Change 
 
Under the value system of neoclassical economics, researchers have attempted to apply 
aggregate calculations to the ecological sphere. Neoclassical economists have attempted to 
calculate not only the costs to protect the environment, and the social cost of carbon, but they 
have also attempted to calculate the total value of Earth’s ecosystems and natural capital 
(Costanza et al. 1997; Costanza et al. 2014; De Groot 1998; Pearce 1998). The literature reveals 
that these calculations are not without their own uncertainties and value judgements. Lastly, this 
section will also provide an overview of the historical traditions and principles of the Austrian 
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framework in relation to climate change policy. 
 
The Calculated Cost 
 
Let us now turn to the literature regarding the economics of climate change. Two 
interesting threads of research reveal some of the limitations of applying economics to climate 
change. Where previous studies attempted to assess the extent of human activity through the 
ecological footprint, other studies have attempted to place a monetary value on the planet’s 
ecological services (Costanza et al. 1997; Costanza et al. 2014; De Groot 1998; Pearce 1998). 
Furthermore, some studies have even come to a consensus on how much it would cost to reduce 
carbon emissions back to levels that would prevent the disastrous effects of a 2°C rise in 
temperature (Stern 2007; Stern 2008). 
Several lines of evidence suggest that the value of global ecosystems can, in fact, be 
calculated (Costanza et al. 1997; Costanza et al. 2014; De Groot 1998; Pearce 1998;). These 
large-scale meta-analyses considered dozens of biomes and ecosystems and their provisioning, 
regulating, habitat, and cultural services. In 1997, a seminal study by Costanza et al. caused 
public debate when they declared the value of the Earth’s ecosystems and natural capital to total 
$33 trillion dollars (259). At the time, this value was equivalent to 1.2 times the global GNP 
(Costanza et al. 1997, 259; Pearce 1998). One serious weakness with Costanza et al.’s (1997) 
valuation of the global ecosystem was that the methodology ignored common economic 
principles like marginal analysis and marginal cost of production while relying on willingness to 
pay. Commenting on Costanza et al.’s (1997) methodology, Pearce argues: 
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Just as it would be absurd to calculate the full volume of a human being on the basis of 
his or her wage-earning power, . . . there exists no absolute value of ecosystem services 
waiting to be discovered and revealed to the world by a member of the intellectual 
community [italics original]. (Pearce 1998, 24). 
  
         Setting aside the underlying methodological and philosophical flaws of Costanza et al.’s 
(1997) research, the study accomplished one of its aims. The study demonstrated that the Earth’s 
global ecosystems and natural capital are valued at more than what is reflected in our lack of 
conservation and attention to climate change. To the surprise of critics, Constanta et al. (2014) 
repeated the study with updated parameters. Using the same biomes as in the prior study, the 
2014 study suggested that the total for all Earth’s global ecosystem services and natural capital 
was $145 trillion per year (Costanza et al. 2014, 157). However, individuals must not be naïve in 
thinking that even this large increase in price represents the truth of the matter. Price should not 
be confused with value.  
         Not only has research shown the unprecedented price of the Earth’s ecosystems and the 
natural capital they provide, but it has also calculated the amount to avoid dangerous climate 
change. Stern (2007, 260) and Stern (2008, 3) concluded that it would cost 1-2% of global GDP 
to avoid a 2°C rise in temperature. In the same vein, Van den Berg (2012c, 570) asks why 
wouldn’t governments spend $25 dollars to insure an asset worth $100,000. As the previous 
review of adaptation/mitigation and the subsequent review of economics reveals, the meeting 
space of economics and climate change is never that simple.   
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Austrian Economic Principles 
Overview 
 
Since Hayek’s renewal of Austrian economics in the 1970s, the school of Austrian 
economics has dwindled in popularity and academic coverage. For that matter, the school of 
Austrian economics is a framework of both normative and positive principles that govern the 
exchanges people make to satisfy their wants and needs. From this framework, Austrian 
economists use foundational principles to draw out policy prescriptions.  
Though extensive research surrounds the school of Austrian economics, it remains 
outside of mainstream economic application and thought. Thus, Austrian economics is rooted 
strongly in the heterodox tradition. Since Austrian economic principles were expounded by a 
relatively small group of scholars that followed in Menger’s mid-19th century tradition, modern 
day Austrians are still in the beginning stages of expanding the methodological and 
epistemological boundaries of Austrian economics. How have they attempted to do so? From the 
texts of early Austrian writers like Menger, Hayek, Böhm von Bawerk, and Mises, modern day 
Austrians have relied on textual exegesis. Another critique of Austrian economics is that it falls 
into the trap of providing only normative principles of economics and has no positive application 
to how economics works in reality.  
Understanding the main economic principles of the Austrian school lies at the heart of 
understanding the view Austrians take towards climate change policy. Peter Boettke, a modern 
proponent of the Austrian school, summarized in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics the 
main principles of Austrian economics which are reproduced here in full with original emphasis:  
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The Science of Economics  
Proposition 1: Only individuals choose.  
Proposition 2: The study of the market order is fundamentally about exchange behavior 
and the institutions within which exchanges take place.  
Proposition 3: The ‘facts’ of the social sciences are what people believe and think.  
 
Microeconomics  
Proposition 4: Utility and costs are subjective.  
Proposition 5: The price system economizes on the information that people need to 
process in making their decisions.  
Proposition 6: Private property in the means of production is a necessary condition for 
rational economic calculation.  
Proposition 7: The competitive market is a process of entrepreneurial discovery.  
 
Macroeconomics  
Proposition 8: Money is nonneutral.  
Proposition 9: The capital structure heterogeneous goods that have multispecific uses 
that must be aligned.  
Proposition 10: Social institutions often are the result of human action, but not of human 
design. (Boettke 2017) 
 
Austrian economists believe that only individuals choose (Cordato 2004, 4; Dawson 
2011, 7; Regan 2015, 225). Since only individual can choose, all economic activity must be 
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examined from the starting point of the individual. Commenting on human behavior, Von Mises 
(1998, 11) writes: 
 
 
Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation 
and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego's meaningful 
response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person's conscious 
adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life. Such paraphrases may 
clarify the definition given and prevent possible misinterpretations. But the definition 
itself is adequate and does not need complement of commentary. 
 
In literature regarding Austrian economics, the term that refers to the purposefulness of 
human behavior is termed the action axiom. Austrian economics holds that if humans act 
purposefully, and given inherent temporal and spatial limits, then scarcity arises. Purposeful ends 
require means. Taken together, the subjective individualism, praxeology, and human action 
axiom constitute the means-ends framework of Austrian economics (Von Mises 1998, 92).  
Furthermore, another reoccurring theme surrounding the Austrian view of climate change 
policy and environmental issues is the notion of property rights. On the importance of property 
rights to Austrian economic thought, Von Mises (1998, 678) argues: 
 
Private ownership of the means of production is the fundamental institution of the market 
economy. It is the institution the presence of which characterizes the market economy as 
such. Where is it absent, there is no question of a market economy.  
 
The literature surrounding Austrian economic thought and environmental issues designated 
property rights as the linchpin (Dolan 2014, 207). Within the literature surrounding mitigation 
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strategies under neoclassical frameworks, the key theme was one of allocation of scarce 
resources. However, the praxeological framework of Austrian economics sees conflict in human 
action as the cause of environmental issues (Dolan 2014, 198). Thus, to Austrian economic 
thought economic policy that protects the rights of the individual must first addresses the conflict 
over individual’s means to attain their ends.  
 
Critique of Neoclassical Approach 
 
Neoclassical and Austrian economics do not inherently produce a specific set of policy 
prescriptions. These economic perspectives should be viewed as a set of economics principles 
that attempt to describe how the world works. Thus, economists must tease out policy from these 
principles. This is the very reason conservative and liberal mainstream economists will provide 
different policy prescriptions using similar principles. 
With that in mind, it is only logical to first describe and explain the Austrian critique of 
neoclassical economics as it relates to environmental policy. The main critiques of the 
neoclassical approach to climate change can be found in two principles: the use of unreliable 
aggregate models of macroeconomics and the faulty belief in perfect competition and 
equilibrium (Brownstein 1980; Cordato 2004; Dawson 2011; Dawson 2013; Dolan 2014; Regan 
2015). What follows is a brief description of the main critiques of neoclassical economics in 
regards to environmental policy from an Austrian economic perspective. 
First, the existing Austrian analyses of neoclassical economics in regards to 
environmental policy are extensive and pay attention to the aggregate methodology of 
neoclassical economics (Brownstein 1980; Dawson 2011; Dawson 2013; Dolan 2014; Regan 
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2015). When Adam Smith and David Ricardo laid the classical foundations upon which 
neoclassical economics was built, they very literally stood on the shoulders of giants. Austrian 
economists point out that neoclassical economics, to be viewed as more credible and empirical, 
was built on borrowed science. Neoclassical economics borrows heavily from the methodologies 
of the Scientific Revolution. Classical economists, and thus neoclassical economists, became 
fascinated with the mathematical laws and formulations embedded within the natural world. 
Thus, neoclassical economics retains some of that scientism; it attempts to mathematically and 
analytically determine the laws that govern the exchanges that people make to satisfy their needs 
and wants. Within the field of macroeconomics, these mathematical and analytical formulations 
can only occur on the aggregate level. This methodology of calculating aggregate social welfare 
and efficiency leaves Austrian economists displeased with the application of neoclassical 
economics to environmental issues. 
The use of aggregate mathematical and analytical models within neoclassical applications 
to environmental issues gives rise to a top-down policy that Austrians economists disagree with. 
Within the neoclassical perspective, mathematical models attempt to calculate the social cost of 
externalities, carbon in particular (Dawson 2011, 13; Dawson 2013, 185; Dolan 2014, 211). As 
Dawson (2013, 187) suggests, the social cost of carbon is not as easy to calculate as prior studies 
by Stern claimed (2007; 2008). First, calculations must find the optimal concentration of carbon 
that averts dangerous climate change. Second, these calculations must then determine the optimal 
level of carbon emissions that allow for suitable environment protectionism and economic 
development. Lastly, the state then must artificially place a social cost, or price of carbon, onto 
carbon emissions to dissuade emitters (Dawson 2013, 187). From the Austrian perspective, this 
top-down, aggregate methodology artificially creates markets and impinges on individual liberty. 
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The fault in neoclassical economics’ aggregate methodology is that it displaces the 
individual liberty of rational economic agents—a key value in neoclassical economics—in favor 
of aggregate social welfare (Brownstein 1980; Cordato 2004; Dawson 2011; Dawson 2013). In 
his critique of aggregate welfare within neoclassical economics, environmental economist 
Graham Dawson (2013, 141) argues the following: 
 
Neoclassical welfare economics is grounded in the defense of the rights of the individual 
against the state but its applications to environmental issues in general and to climate 
change in particular subordinates individual rights to aggregate or social welfare, 
measured by the monetary value of the benefits and costs of policy.  
 
Dawson properly notes that finding the optimal climate change policy with neoclassical 
methodologies leaves the rights of the individual unprotected. Austrian economics has no 
problem with the ends of neoclassical economics in regards to climate change. The greatest 
amount of aggregate or social welfare is a noble and worthy ideal. The problem lies in the 
means. Within the Austrian economic framework, in achieving the greatest aggregate welfare 
where all parties are better off, individual rights and liberty must remain protected and not 
subordinate to the state. 
Furthermore, previous research has established that aggregate models within neoclassical 
economics abandon Pareto optimality (Brownstein 1980; Cordato 2004; Dawson 2013; Regan 
2015). Economists use the term ‘Pareto optimality’ or ‘Pareto efficiency’ to refer to a state of 
completely efficient allocation of resources in which one individual’s condition cannot be made 
better off without making another individual’s condition worse off (Brownstein 1980; Cordato 
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2004, 4; Dawson 2013, 189). Thus, Austrian economists argue that from the individual-centered 
roots of Pareto optimality, aggregate welfare economics and the subsequent policies of top-down 
environmental protections cannot be logically deduced (Brownstein 1980, 95). 
Second, a number of studies have found that Austrian economists disagree with the 
neoclassical idea of equilibrium between supply and demand that leads to the efficient allocation 
of resources (Cordato 2004; Dawson 2013; Regan 2015). Neoclassical economics contains the 
assumption of equilibrium. Within economics, equilibrium is the state in which supply and 
demand within markets are equal and prices stabilize. Commenting on the mathematical 
treatment of economics, Ludwig von Mises writes, “In the world of real human action, in the life 
of a licing human being, there can never be a state that corresponds to the mental construct of a 
static economy” (Von Mises 1977, 99). The literature regarding Austrian economics sees this 
static view of equilibrium as a fault in neoclassical theory. As environmental and property rights 
scholar Regan (2015, 203) writes, “Neoclassical economists study markets as if they exist in or 
rapidly attain a state of equilibrium.” As proponents of Austrian economics note, neither markets 
nor ecological systems attain equilibrium (Dawson 2011; Dawson 2013; Regan 2015). In relation 
to climate change policy, neoclassical economists assume that there is an optimal balance 
between supply and demand. 
Neoclassical environmentalists would view demand as the quantity of carbon that 
emitters require for their production and consumption functions. Conversely, neoclassical 
economists would view supply as the quantity of carbon that environmental policy measures 
stipulate. Uncertainties within climate change science make finding these optimal quantities 
difficult. The studies regarding the ecological footprint, increased carbon concentrations, and 
global temperature rises already attest to the fact that the global demand for carbon emissions has 
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already exceeded the natural ecological rate of supply (Allen et al. 2009; Kerr 2004; Lynas 2007; 
Pittock 2005; Stern 2008; Wackernagel 2002;). 
Moreover, recent ecological research is also reverting the age-old myth that ecosystems 
attain equilibrium (Regan 2015, 204). Regan states blatantly: “Indeed, for much of their history 
ecologists have tended to study ecological systems as if they achieved equilibria. Although 
equilibrium models are analytically appealing, they have proven to be inconsistent with the way 
ecosystems function in reality” (Regan 2015, 208). Ecosystems—just like markets—grow, adapt, 
and must respond to ecological booms and busts (Regan 2015, 208). To Austrians, the 
neoclassical idea of equilibrium and the resulting market-based attempts to efficiently allocate 
carbon emissions is not only theoretical but also counter to the ecological principles in which the 
problem of climate change occurs.  
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Chapter 4 Findings 
 
Purpose and Organization 
 
Fundamentally, this study holds a singular principle to be true of academic discovery in 
general and liberal education in particular. Small questions, safe and necessary, lead to small 
discoveries. Bigger questions are dangerous. Bigger questions, when hurled at unyielding ears 
and positioned against the status quo, can be fatal to the inquirer. Bigger questions can create 
mental empowerment and insatiable curiosity. Bigger questions can revolutionize and radicalize 
whole societies. The big question that this study focuses on is how should humanity steward the 
planet. 
Economics is an important component in addressing climate change. This discipline lies 
at the heart of the climate change problem and its possible solutions. The excessive production 
and consumption that leads to increased GHG emissions and climate change are fundamentally 
rooted in the economic sphere. The values rooted within economic schools and perspectives then 
provide the best way to manage carbon emissions to avoid dangerous climate change. 
 Considering the literature surrounding climate change and neoclassical economics, the 
following research question arises: if standard economic theory has failed to mitigate the effects 
of climate change on a scale commensurate to the problem, what macro-level policy proposals 
can Austrian economics offer that will be feasible, efficient, and equitable? The purpose of this 
study is to address and discuss whether the Austrian policies toward climate change are feasible, 
efficient, and equitable. In short, this study set out to determine whether these alternative 
economic schools of thought shed light on solutions to climate change in a more constructive 
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manner than neoclassical economics. This paper critically challenges the view that heterodox 
economic perspectives should be viewed as unreasonable and purely theoretical. 
The exploratory question of proper stewardship and the research question of alternative 
policy prescriptions require a project of limited scope as these questions are extensive. Thus, this 
paper aimed to (1) bridge the gap between environmental protectionism and economic 
development, (2) highlight the importance of the heterodox economic school of thought, and (3) 
construct feasible, efficient, and equitable policy to climate change. To adequately answer the 
research question and accomplish the study’s aims, the study must also accomplish the following 
objectives: 
 
● Discuss the relevant literature concerning initiated climate change policy 
● Explain mainstream economics sufficiency at addressing climate change 
● Evaluate the mitigation policy of carbon pricing  
● Analyze the frameworks of Austrian economics 
● Formulate a set of adaptation and mitigation policies considering the heterodox 
approach to economics 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and describe the study’s results in a systematic, 
concise, and detailed manner. The information and data presented in this chapter summarizes the 
findings of the research. Following in the tradition of the heterodox approach that shies away 
from purely mathematical reasoning and aligning with the interdisciplinary nature of this study, 
the results presented in this chapter will be both qualitatively and quantitatively summarized. The 
study’s results will be organized based on the study’s aforementioned objectives. For all 
qualitative findings, these will be addressed thematically. For all quantitative findings, a synopsis 
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of overall trends will be provided along with key observations. Tables and figures are labeled 
numerically in the order in which they are presented. All tables and figures whose messages are 
better conveyed in color are produced in color. Tables and figures that retain their message 
without color are presented in grayscale.  
 
Concerning Initiated Climate Change Policy 
Science 
 
 
 
Figure 1. World ecological footprint and biocapacity represented in billions (B) of global hectares over time, 1961-
2013. The ecological footprint represents global demand on the Earth's resources. Biocapacity represents the Earth's 
natural regenerative capacity. Respectively, the ecological reserve and ecological deficit represent global production 
and consumption staying within and exceeding biocapacity. Source: Global Footprint Network 2017. 
 
 
Figure 1 presents an overview of the world’s ecological footprint and biocapacity as a 
result of economic production and consumption processes. From this figure, it is apparent that 
global demand on Earth’s natural resources has exceeded the Earth’s regenerative and absorptive 
capacity. Interestingly, the global ecological footprint has increased even since the rise of 
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extensive environmental discussions and protections and the First World Climate Conference in 
1979. Overall, these results indicate that the global system of economic production and 
consumption have exceeded ecologically sustainable rates. 
 
  
 
Figure 2. Total annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (gigatonne of CO2-equivalent per year, 
GtCO2-eq/yr) for the period 1970 to 2010 by gases: CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; CO2 
from Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); fluorinated gases covered under 
the Kyoto Protocol (F-gases). Source: IPCC 2014, 5.  
 
 
Figure 2 provides the quantitative breakdown of annual anthropogenic GHG emissions 
by type of gas. From the graph above we can see that annual emissions of nitrous oxide (N2O), 
methane (CH4), carbon dioxide (CO2) from forestry and other land use have decreased from 
1970 to 2010. What stands out in this figure is the overwhelming contribution of CO2 from fossil 
fuels and industrial processes to total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions. CO2 from fossil fuel 
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and industrial processes represented 65% of the total annual GHG emissions in 2010. From the 
period of 1970 to 2010, CO2 emissions from fossil fuel and industrial processed increased by 
10%. In Figure 2 there is a clear trend of increasing annual emissions, specifically CO2 from 
fossil fuel usage, despite mechanisms to reduce carbon emissions.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration represented in the ratio of parts per million 
of carbon dioxide molecules to all molecules in the atmosphere, since 1958. Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 
measurements from Mauna Loa (19º32’N, 155º34’W—red) and South Pole (89º59’S, 24º48’W—black) since 1958. 
Source: IPCC 2013, 12. 
 
 
As shown in Figure 3, cumulative CO2 emissions represented in parts per million (ppm) 
have steadily increased over time. Data from this figure can be compared with the data in Figure 
2 which shows the quantitative breakdown of annual anthropogenic GHG emissions by type of 
gas. IPCC Assessment Reports (2007; 2014) and Hansen et al. (2008) argue for a stabilization 
level of 350 ppm to avoid dangerous climate change. Figure 3 show clearly that as of the late 
1980s, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have surpassed the recommended stabilization level.   
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Table 1 illustrates the likelihood of exceeding various temperature increases according to 
multiple stabilization levels represented in parts per million (ppm) of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2e). This chart confines the resulting likelihood of exceeding temperatures to the range of 
2ºC to 7ºC for the stabilization levels 450 ppm CO2e to 750 ppm CO2e. A stabilizing level of 450 
ppm CO2e offers some protection against temperature increases of 4ºC and more. From the table 
above, a stabilization level of 450 ppm CO2e produces a 78% likelihood of exceeding a 2ºC 
temperature increase at equilibrium. The literature surrounding climate change policy denotes 
that 2ºC constitutes potentially dangerous climate change. Overall, these results indicate that a 
stabilization level around or greater than 450 ppm CO2e has a higher likelihood of inducing 
dangerous climate change at equilibrium.  
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Figure 4. Map of observed surface temperature change from 1901 to 2012 derived from temperature trends 
determined by linear regression from one dataset. Trends have been calculated where data availability permits a 
robust estimate (i.e., only for grid boxes with greater than 70% complete records and more than 20% data 
availability in the first and last 10% of the time period). Other areas are white. Grid boxes where the trend is 
significant at the 10% level are indicated by a + sign. Source: IPCC 2013, 6. 
 
 
Figure 4 reveals that there has been a marked increase in global observed surface 
temperatures since 1901. According to the data, areas within South America, in the Sahara, and 
across Asia have experienced a sharp increase of 1.5ºC or more since 1901. The Atlantic Ocean 
and parts of the southern parts of the United States have experienced a drop in observed surface 
temperature since 1901. Figure 4 shows overall that the trend for global observed surface 
temperature from 1901 to 2012 is one of marked increase.  
 
Adaptation & Mitigation 
 
This section within “Findings” will present the qualitative themes found within the 
research into adaptation and carbon taxation of climate change. Within this section, quantitative 
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data will be presented to address both adaptation funding commitments and the embedded 
inequalities in the climate change problem.  
Adaptation, given the already irreversible effects of climate change, is not a choice. 
Reference to Table 1 supports this finding. Table 1 shows that a stabilization level around or 
greater than 450 ppm CO2e has a higher likelihood of inducing dangerous climate change at 
equilibrium. With a stabilization level of 450 ppm CO2e, there is a 78% likelihood of exceeding 
a 2ºC temperature increase at equilibrium. Taking into account increased production and 
consumption processes, the lack of support for the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period, 
and the uncertainty sensitive of the climate system, the cumulative concentration of CO2 is likely 
to increase after 2017 and increase the likelihood of a 2ºC temperature increase. A 
comprehensive adaptation policy is a must (Anderson & Bows 2011). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Graph of the status of adaptation funds. Pledged, deposited, and approved funds are represented in 
millions of U.S. dollars. Amounts have been totaled from the Adaptation Fund, the sixth phase (2014-2018) of the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) Trust Fund, the Green Climate Fund, and the Least Developed Countries Fund. 
Source: Climate Funds Update 2016.  
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Measures of adaptation and mitigation do not occur in a vacuum devoid of global issues 
related to funding and financing (Ciplet et al. 2013). Figure 5 and Table 2 represent that status of 
adaptation funding in millions of US$ in two different formats. Figure 5 shows the overall trend 
with adaptation funding. Table 2 numerically represents this trend of slow allocation of 
adaptation funding. Though over 95% of pledged funding across these four funds have been 
deposited, only 20% of the funding has been allocated to its recipients. What is surprising about 
the data is the approval of funding for the Green Climate Fund. Only 11% of funding pledged to 
the Green Climate Fund has been approved. The aforementioned figure and table reveal that 
though funding commitments have been made to adaptation funds, these deposits have not been 
yet allocated.   
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Figure 6. Map of multilateral pledges of adaptation funds. Pledged funding amounts are represented in millions of 
U.S. dollars. The data in this chart is based on information received from the twenty-six multilateral, bilateral, 
regional, and national climate funds regularly monitored by the Climate Funds Update. Source: Climate Funds 
Update 2016.  
 
 
Figure 6 displays the global distribution of pledged adaptation funding by country. The 
figure above shows that the overall trend of adaptation funding is from developed, industrialized 
countries. The map also shows little to no pledged adaptation funding from developed countries. 
Not shown clearly on the map are the top three pledges of adaptation funding: United Kingdom, 
Germany, and France. Figure 6 shows that pledges of adaptation funding are overwhelmingly 
OECD members.  
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Figure 7. Map of multilateral recipients of adaptation funds. Received funding amounts are represented in millions 
of U.S. dollars. The data in this chart is based on information received from the twenty-six multilateral, bilateral, 
regional, and national climate funds regularly monitored by the Climate Funds Update. Source: Climate Funds 
Update 2016.  
 
 
Figure 7 shows the global distribution of received adaptation funding by country. As 
shown in the above figure, the overall trend of adaptation funding is towards developing 
countries, countries with economies in transition (EITs), least developed countries, and small 
island developing states (SIDS). Not clearly represented on the map are the top ten recipients of 
adaptation funding: Bangladesh, Niger, Cambodia, Mozambique, Nepal, Bolivia, Zambia, 
Tajikistan, Mali, and Samoa. The figure shows that these countries lie overwhelming in the 
Caribbean, Central and South America, Africa, and Asia. 
A considerable amount of literature has been published on GHG emissions, specifically 
focusing on carbon emissions (CDIAC 2017; EDGAR 2016; World Bank 2016; WRI 2017). 
These studies and numerous others have provided an accurate, empirical measurement of GHG 
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emissions and CO2 emissions, the main cause of atmospheric warming. This body of empirical 
research shows alarming trends. As of 2015, previous studies have reported that China, the 
United States, India, Russia, and Japan are the top five emitters of CO2 (CDIAC 2017; EDGAR 
2016: World Bank 2016; WRI 2017). In 2006, China overtook the United States as the world’s 
leading emitter of GHGs and CO2 (World Bank 2016).  
 
  
 
Explain Mainstream Economics’ Sufficiency 
 
Mainstream neoclassical economics ignores the interconnected social and natural spheres 
in which the economic sphere is embedded (Plater et al. 2008). Two major themes occurred 
within the research. First, mainstream neoclassical economics ignores the unbalanced demand of 
the marketplace economy on the natural economy. Economic processes of production and 
consumption occur within a natural economy that is not infinite. Neoclassical economics 
imposes equilibrium on to economic and ecological systems that organically operate in more 
dynamic ways. Neoclassical economics ignored the economic spheres connection to the natural 
sphere by prioritizing profit over environmental protection. An excerpt from a memo signed by 
Lawrence Summers, former Chief Economist of the World Bank, reveals the dangerous of 
applying economic logic to environmental issues: 
 
Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging more migration of 
the dirty industries to the LDCS? . . . I think the economic logic behind dumping a load 
of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that. 
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The costs of pollution are likely to be non-linear as the initial increments of pollution 
probably have very low cost. I've always thought that under-populated countries in Africa 
are vastly under-polluted. (Summers 1992a).  
 
Solid neoclassical logic suggests that there are vast economic advantages to dumping toxic waste 
in LDCs and allowing LDC to bear the consequences of environmental degradation. Neoclassical 
economics, or capitalism as “business as usual”, is insufficient as a model for handling climate 
change because it gives primacy to immediate profit over future ecological concern (Foster 1993; 
Summers 1992a; Summers 1992b).   
Second, findings show that neoclassical economics removes climate change from its 
human origins in. The literature surrounding climate change focuses on the human cause of 
increased GHG emissions. The research findings show that neoclassical economics, with its 
aggregate methodology, removes climate change from its individualistic and human-centered 
origins.  
 
Analyze Austrian Economics 
 
The research showed that a heterodox framework is necessary to break free from the 
confines of sustainability as defined solely by economic growth (Klitgaard 2013). Austrian 
economics provides a more individualistic conception of climate change than neoclassical 
economics. To conserve space, the proposed Austrian economic policy is addressed in detail in 
the “Discussion.” 
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Policy Construction 
 
A new imagination of the organizational principles of economic exchanges may shed 
light on solutions to the climate change crisis. These economic perspectives should provide not 
only a new theoretical basis but must also be applicable to reality. Infertile theory, though it 
fosters discussion, does not lead to practical solutions. Three broad themes that Austrian 
economics must address emerged from the research: adaptation, mitigation, and pragmatism.  
First, alternative economics perspectives must address adaptation to climate change. 
Regarding adaptation policy, Austrian economics must address the inadequacy of adaptation 
funding, the difficulties of recipient criteria, and the realities of governance (Adger et al. 2005; 
Adger et al. 2009; Ciplet et al. 2013). Findings suggest that there is a gap between pledged funds 
and allocated funds for adaptation measures. These perspectives must address how to calculate 
vulnerability and economic need. Vulnerability is a question grounded in ecological theory, but it 
is also an economic question because GDP aside, there are various ways to assess the economic 
growth and need of countries. As mentioned, economic processes cannot function without a 
civic-societal component. The combined values embedded in civic society and inherent in 
economic thought give rise to the economic system in which adaptations funds are allocated. 
Exogenous measures such as Pigovian taxes and carbon taxes require a civic society, or state, to 
levy and enforce them. Other means of endogenous adaptation policy and mitigation policy also 
requires civic-societal organization to ensure fruitful coordination and cooperation.  
Second, Austrian economics must address mitigation to climate change. Policy must 
address the already established mechanism of carbon pricing.  
Third, any policies that are formulated must be pragmatic. The findings of the research 
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suggest that pragmatic adaptation and mitigation policies can be assessed by the feasibility, 
efficiency, and equity of the policy (Büchs et al. 2011; Liu et al. 2017). Feasibility is a question 
of the policies practicality. Does the economic perspective provide only theoretical solutions? 
What are the barriers to enforcing such a policy? What are the dimensional spillovers of such a 
policy? Efficiency is a question of finding the maximum outcome with minimal effort, waste, 
dimensional spillovers, or other negative effects. Within the framework of the various economic 
perspectives, what is efficient economic policy? Lastly, given viewpoints that arose in the 
literature review, findings suggests that economic policy must address the inequalities embedded 
in the climate change crisis. Will the proposed economic policy protect the interests of 
industrialized and developing countries equitably? How do these proposed economic policies 
protect the liberties of emitters and non-emitters alike?   
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Chapter 5 Discussions 
 
The “Introduction,” presented sub-questions. This section will not only discuss those 
questions but will also present a thorough analysis of the Austrian perspective to climate change. 
Regarding Austrian economics, this section will discuss the ideas of privatizing climate change 
policy, defining property rights, and using tort litigation. This discussion section will also 
address how might a privatized climate change policy affect measures of adaptation and 
mitigation. Within this discussion, this paper will address carbon pricing, emissions trading, and 
technology and energy pricing. An adequate discussion of the literature review and the findings 
will also include the implications for economic development, sustainable development, and 
equity. Last, policies will also be analyzed for their feasibility, efficiency, and equity.  
 
Neoclassical Economics’ Sufficiency 
 
The first question sought to determine neoclassical economics’ sufficiency for handling 
climate change externalities. Though it presents promising and practical solutions to the climate 
change crisis, the research found that neoclassical economics has limitations and cautions 
neoclassical economics uses market-based measures to mitigate climate change. However, 
carbon taxation as it currently stands can only do so much to mitigate climate change. 
First, this study must note certain value judgments. Neoclassical economics should not be 
confused with capitalism. Neoclassical economics and capitalism contain their own distinct value 
judgments. Whereas non-academic and mainstream critiques of climate change policy under 
BAU conflate neoclassical economics and capitalism, this study is cognizant of keeping them 
separate. Neoclassical economics is only one approach to economic theory. It views economic 
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exchanges between rational individuals as a way of maximizing profit or utility of goods. On the 
other hand, capitalism is a social, political, economic, and legal system that advocates for 
individual rights, freedom, private over state control of markets, and the subjective rule of law. 
Neoclassical economics can be seen as just one economic theory and capitalism as just one way 
of practicing that theory within a social, political, and legal context. 
From the research and findings on climate change science, it is easy to see that the 
economic production and consumption is assumed to be a contributor to rising GHG emissions 
and pushing the planet towards dangerous climate change. The findings of the study show that 
global economic demand for production and consumption resources has already exceeded the 
Earth’s natural supply, or in other words, its regenerative capacity (Allen et al. 2009; Arrow et al. 
1995; IPCC 2013; Lynas 2008; Solomon 2009; Stern 2008; Wackernagel 1999; Wackernagel et 
al. 2002). It can thus be suggested that the neoclassical model with conceptions of infinite 
growth cannot survive on a finite planet. 
Carbon pricing relies on climate change science. As the findings evinced, carbon pricing 
depends upon a complex set of steps with deeply embedded uncertainties. Scientists can 
calculate annual carbon emissions flows and cumulative atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide and other GHGs with increasing accuracy. However, the science is not perfect. To 
predict future increases in observed global temperatures, computational models rely on a wide 
range of data sets that attempt to correlate cumulative carbon dioxide emissions with temperature 
increases. From these data sets and computational models a stabilization target, or level at which 
dangerous climate change can be avoided, can be calculated. In the “Findings” chapter data 
showed that a stabilization level of 450ppm CO2-eq still presented a high possibility of leading to 
a 2°C increase in temperature. Thus, scientists and policymakers can argue for any stabilization 
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level below 450ppm CO2-eq. 
From this complex science, scientists and intergovernmental organizations must then 
determine appropriate levels of annual CO2 carbon dioxide emissions flows so as not to exceed 
the cumulative stabilization target. From these stabilization targets, the social costs of carbon can 
be calculated and artificially injected into the marketplace. With both carbon pricing and carbon 
trading, there is responsibility falls on individual countries to place a price on carbon pollution to 
mitigate climate change and increase investments in cleaner options.  
Opponents to carbon pricing and carbon trading reveal the implicit value assumptions 
woven into the social cost of carbon. Nature provides provisioning services, regulating services, 
and cultural services (Van den Berg 2012c, 563). Provisioning services relate to those goods that 
humans consume directly (Van den Berg 2012c, 563). Even in the presence of rapid 
globalization, industrialization, and urbanization, humans still depend fundamentally on the 
Earth’s provisioning services. Every good produced comes from natural and raw materials. The 
earth regulates the climate in a myriad of ways such as converting the air we breathe, converting 
minerals and soil into the crops we eat, and recycling the water we drink. Cultural services are 
those services that integrate into other aspects of social life (Van den Berg 2012c, 563). The 
environment functions as a social and spiritual reservoir. In the calculations of the social cost of 
carbon, how can one possibly calculate all of the Earth's provisioning, regulating, and supporting 
services, let alone its cultural services? Neoclassical economics in that regard confuses price with 
value. 
The hidden value assumptions within the neoclassical economic approach to climate 
change are not the only fault in its measures. Implementing the resulting policy is also 
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impractical. According to the research, intergovernmentally agreed upon climate change policy 
may come to a standstill because there is no suprainternational authority to regulate and enforce 
the policies (Chang 2010; Finus 2008; Norhaus 2006; Nordhaus 2014). Thus, it becomes the 
responsibility of countries to ratify policies such as the Kyoto Protocol. Neoclassical economics 
fails to see that the economic sphere is also embedded within the civic societal sphere. It seems 
likely that in an ideal world with a suprainternational authority with the power to implement and 
enforce internationally agreed upon policies, the neoclassical economic solution of carbon 
pricing, and thus carbon trading, would be ideal. Unfortunately, economic theory must face the 
realities of governance.  
For example, the Kyoto Protocol which attempts to regulate the carbon emissions of 
Annex I countries, claims that it is “legally binding.” Underneath the Kyoto Protocol, countries 
must voluntarily agree to reduce emissions flows over two commitment period as mentioned in 
the literature review. These annual emission targets are voluntarily agreed upon and self-
negotiated (Chang 2010; Finus 2008). It is interesting to note that the United States is not a 
ratifying member of Kyoto Protocol. Canada also is not a member of the Kyoto Protocol. China, 
the current leading emitter of carbon dioxide, has no emission restrictions. It is surprising that the 
Kyoto Protocol claims to be legally binding. Binding protocols like the Kyoto Protocol and the 
UNFCCC promise to be legally binding, but the research shows they are relatively unenforceable 
(Chang 2010; Finus 2008). 
These results seem to suggest that as an economic model neoclassical economics is 
promising though insufficient at addressing climate change. The neoclassical model of 
economics based on obtaining equilibrium within the marketplace does not address the 
overlapping spheres of the natural economy and the civic societal economy. Furthermore, the 
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solutions of mainstream economics, though internally valid and seemingly practical, has major 
drawbacks; one being the inability of mainstream economics to calculate the social cost of 
carbon accurately, adequately, and sufficiently based on uncertain science. Perhaps the most 
serious disadvantage of the neoclassical solutions to climate change lies in the civic-societal 
sphere. Climate change policies such as the Kyoto Protocol may provide more bite than the 
UNFCCC, but without truly legally binding measures, they are still toothless. If countries 
withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol or their emissions targets are not met, they only risk looking 
hypocritical to the international political community (Chang 2010; Finus 2008).  
 
Proposed Austrian Environmental Policy 
 
The second sub-question presented in the “Introduction” asked why the Austrian 
perspective is useful in analyzing environmental externalities produced by the current economic 
system of production and consumption. The following pages will discuss this question using the 
literature review and findings.  
Reason would have it that if the current global processes of economic production and 
consumption guided by mainstream economic principles have contributed to the global climate 
change crisis and have provided only cursory solutions, then there is a need for alternative 
theories and practices. The findings of the study support the idea that there is a place for Austrian 
economics within discussions of climate change policy. 
The Austrian economic perspective is useful in analyzing externalities produced by the 
current economic system of production and consumption. The research found that Austrian 
economics is not just a subfield of neoclassical economics, but an entirely different framework 
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that prioritizes different principals and ways of reasoning. The research found that Austrian 
economics contains the principles of praxeology, the human action axiom, the principal of 
subjective costs, and the means-ends framework (Cordato 2004; Dawson 2011; Dawson 2013; 
Dolan 2014; Von Mises 1977; Von Mises 1998). These principles are not found within the 
neoclassical system of economic analysis. Thus, this study has demonstrated that Austrian 
economics is a new angle from which to view the climate change crisis. 
This study found that the Austrian policies of privatizing all existing climate change 
policy, resolving conflicts that arise from the use of resources, and relying on tort litigation to 
solve interpersonal conflicts have their limitations. The research on Austrian economic policy for 
climate change suggests that Austrian economics’ privatization of policy, though internally valid, 
may not be feasible, efficient, or equitable. 
Turing to the proposed policy, the following quote by Dawson (2011, 19) summarizes the 
Austrian approach to climate change policy: 
  
The Austrian or libertarian policy must, therefore, be to prioritizing ‘climate change 
policy,’ repealing all existing climate change legislation. The tax treatment of fossil fuels 
should be revised to eliminate any tax contributions that have been imposed with the 
intention of reducing carbon emissions. Regulations aimed at reducing carbon emissions 
should be rescinded. National or supranational emissions trading systems should be 
wound up; private firms and individuals wish to continue to issue and trade permits, it 
would, of course, be free to do so. Official carbon emissions reduction targets should be 
abandoned. There should be no climate change policy objectives or instruments.  
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Based on the research and literature, Austrian economics proposes the repeal of all state-
based climate change policy regulating carbon emissions, carbon taxation, and national or 
supranational emissions trading systems. According to the findings, we can infer that this type of 
policy may be unfeasible. It is possible that Austrians have ignored the three spheres of society. 
Yes, policy measures can be rescinded. However, these national and supranational regulations, 
taxations, and emissions trading systems, taxations have also contributed to investment in clean 
energies options. It is, therefore, likely that the repeal of all public climate change policies may 
cause a decline in clean energy investments. One major drawback of the Austrian economic 
policy is that it does not address the economic and social spillovers that a mass repeal of climate 
change policy may cause.  
Regarding adaptation measures, Austrian economists believe the only appropriate policy 
to climate change is the policy of adaptation (Dawson 2011, 2). Austrian economists overlook 
that calculating the cost of adaptation contains some of same the limitations as calculating the 
social cost of carbon. From the research and the findings, it seems that calculating the cost of 
adaptation measures does not receive the same intensity of opposition. From the literature review 
and the findings of the study, Austrian economists may approve of adaptation policy because it is 
not necessarily dependent upon top-down national and supranational infringement on individual 
liberty. It is possible that from the Austrian economic point of view individuals and firms if they 
would like to do so, could implement adaptation policy without state intervention.  
The literature review and findings support the initial assumption that Austrian economics 
provides important theoretical contributions to creating climate change policy. Austrian 
economics does well to not leave policy within a vacuum. In general, the Austrian economic 
perspective is averse to the concept of market failures because market booms and busts are part 
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of the natural catallactic efficiency of economies (Cordato 2004; Dawson 2011; Dawson 2013). 
Thus, the research and findings show that from the Austrian perspective climate change is not a 
market failure but an interpersonal conflict. It follows that public policy in relation to 
environmental issues should not concern itself with efficiently allocating resources. Instead, 
public policy should concern itself with resolving the conflict over resources from which 
externalities occur. 
The Austrian economic framework is rooted in a strong theoretical and scholarly 
tradition. As Hardin’s (1968) iconic article “The Tragedy of the Commons” explains, when 
public goods or means are used to satisfy the complex and varied ends of individuals, the tragedy 
is twofold. Public use of the public good to suit so many needs will ultimately lead to destruction 
and the use of these public goods will result in conflict over the formation of plans. Thus, 
Austrian economists, following in the tradition of Von Misses proposal that property rights are 
the linchpin for a functioning marketplace, believe that lack of property rights cause externalities 
such as pollution. In relation to climate change policy, Austrian economists argue that poorly 
defined property rights are the root cause of externalities. In summary, Stocker (1996, 4) writes: 
  
If the structure of property rights leaves too much room for externalities, i.e. there’s 
uncertainty about what can be done with certain resources, (like e.g.  air and ground 
water, oil-fields or fishing grounds etc.)  the handling of these resources can almost a 
certainty assumed to be far from efficient.  
  
Thus, the privatization of climate change policy and the proper definition of property 
rights contributes new definitions to discussions of climate change. From the literature and 
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research, Austrian economics provides new definitions to the terms polluter and pollution. In 
environmental studies, it is widely agreed that pollution can be defined as excessive GHG 
emissions or other substances that deplete or degrade the Earth’s natural quantity and quality of 
air, water, or land. However, Austrian economics contributes to the field of environmental issues 
by providing a human context for climate change. Within this framework, a polluter can be said 
to be one that, using their own means, infringes upon the use of another individual’s means to 
achieve their ends. These new definitions are not without their limitations.  
Cordato (2014, 8) claims: 
 
If there were no recreational users of the river or housing developments downwind from 
the pig farm there be no pollution. Environmental problems are not really problems for or 
with the environment, but human problems of mutual formulation and achievement of 
goals. 
 
Cordato’s argument relies too heavily on the subjective individualist concepts of praxeology and 
the human action axiom. From the point of view of the Austrians, if no other individual’s rights 
are impinged upon, then pollution does not exist. In reference to direct land degradation from 
polluted rivers, streams, and lakes, victims may directly determine whether the use of one 
individual’s resources has negatively affected their land, crops, or other resources. However, the 
case is not so simple for carbon emissions and air pollution. From an ethical, or environmental 
perspective, can the concept of pollutions’ existence only if there is a witness to it, only if 
another party or individual finds fault, be accepted? 
Instead of asking how should humanity steward the planet, Austrians prefer to ask how 
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do institutions help resolve conflicts of human demand on the Earth’s dynamically changing 
resources. These two radically different questions will contribute different answers to discussions 
of climate change policy. 
Prior studies have noted that a final contribution from the Austrian literature to climate 
change policy is the concept of mass litigation. The current study found that once property rights 
are well-defined, Austrian economists believe that using strict liability, tort litigation can take the 
place of all existing national and suprainternational emissions regulations and trading schemes. 
In a sense, privatized climate change policy and tort litigation are equitable. However, the 
Austrian framework fails to address the large procedural and institutional barriers that such as ill-
defined property rights, the burden of proof, and the issue of compensation.  
Regarding compensation, tort litigation can result in damages for the complainant or in a 
reduction of harm, in this case being GHG emissions. If this tort litigation results in 
compensation for the complainant, the complainant would receive damages for any harm or 
injury as a result of the pollution. It is possible, therefore, that the compensation would be the 
mechanism that would communicate to other emitters the price of pollution and other emitters 
could then preemptively exempt themselves from future tort litigation by voluntarily reducing 
their GHG emissions and investing in cleaner options.  
On critiquing the Austrian economic framework for climate change policy, Dolan (2014, 
213) argues that “failure to compensate is not only unjust; it distorts choices about the use of 
environmental resources and inhibits coordination.” However, if under tort litigation the 
complainant is returned to their original state, then compensation is unnecessary. In regards to 
the feasibility of Austrian economic policy to climate change, the lack of compensation for 
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complainants is not only inequitable; it is unjust. The research shows that Austrian economists 
make no attempt to give sufficient consideration to this injustice.  
What is surprising is that the main contention that Austrian economists have with 
neoclassical economics becomes a contradiction within the Austrian economic framework. As 
the literature shows, the Austrian economic framework disapproves of the aggregate 
methodology of neoclassical economics and calculating the social cost carbon. Furthermore, the 
literature also shows a distrust of climate change science. However, the same mathematical 
calculations, aggregate methodologies, and climate change science would factor into calculating 
damages for pollution victims. According to this data, we can infer that it is not, in fact, the use 
of aggregate methodologies in place of true Pareto optimality that Austrian disapprove of. These 
findings suggest that the main contention with public climate change policy is that it uses public 
mechanisms to deal with a problem that should be handled privately. 
This research, while preliminary, suggests that Austrian economic policy for mitigating 
climate change, though rooted in a strong history and internally valid, is not feasible, is 
inefficient, and only partially equitable. Privatizing climate change policy is not feasible or 
efficient because the Austrian economic school, in relation to environmental issues, commits the 
Nirvana fallacy. Thus, the Austrian economic framework is a model for normative economics 
that examines and determines how the world should work. One criticism of much of the literature 
on Austrian economics is that the school of thought does not contribute to positive economics, or 
how economics is practiced. Concerning property rights, they are cloudy. Concerning 
enforcement, it is shallow. As Dolan (2014, 212) critiques further, “The starting point [of 
Austrian economics] is a reality in which there’re no markets for pollution and no prices.” In 
sum, the research suggests that Austrian economic policy is unfeasible and inefficient because 
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the starting point for Austrian economics is a world in which large procedural and institutional 
barriers exist to its implementation. 
In terms of economic development, these results further support the idea that the Austrian 
economic framework protects the entrepreneurial discovery of each individual through the 
definition and expansion of property rights so as to avoid the tragedy of the commons. In terms 
of environmental protection, these findings suggest that the Austrian economic framework 
situates climate change mitigation in an institutional and social system that does not yet exist and 
leaves climate change adaptation to private firms and individuals. In terms of social equity (the 
last leg of the three-legged stool of sustainable development), this paper suggests that the 
Austrian economic framework, with its proposal of strict liability under tort litigation, creates a 
legal impossibility for pollution victims. Furthermore, the Austrian economic framework fails to 
address the institutional and procedural impossibility of mass tort litigation for LDCs with 
unstable, poorly defined, and chaotic social, civic, and legal institutions. This research, though 
precursory, proposes that for mitigating climate change the Austrian economic framework, 
though it is internally robust and is a model for normative economics, is not feasible, is 
inefficient, and only partially equitable. 
Thus, from the review of literature, the findings, and the discussion of Austrian 
economics, this research suggests that “both/and” solutions as opposed to either/or solutions are 
necessary (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. 2015, 226). To combat dangerous climate change, both 
mitigation and adaptation should be given equal consideration. This study also reveals that both 
neoclassical economics and Austrians economics have their limitations. Neoclassical economics 
offers a practical solution based on unsound logic. On the other hand, Austrian economics offers 
rock solid internal logic but a policy that is hard to implement. Thus, this paper offers the 
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both/and solution of leaving the Kyoto Protocol for the creation of a global carbon price under 
the mechanism of carbon taxation while also strengthening and defining property rights where 
they are valid. This paper is of the view point that the application of property rights to the public 
good of airspace is harder to implement, than say, for waterways and fisheries. However, where 
property rights can be more strongly defined, this paper suggests that such a task is undertaken. 
If this paper is to provide a both/and solution to climate change, it should not fail to address 
adaptation. Though this prescription is cursory, but all revenues from a global carbo tax could be 
allocated towards investments in cleaner energy sources and towards adaptation funds with 
preference given to LDCs and developing countries.  
The chapter that follows will present key implications drawn from the “Disucssion.” 
Next, this chapter will pinpoint the limitations of the research. Last, this chapter will close with 
suggestions for further research and a call to individual agency in solving the climate change 
crisis.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
The data surrounding the anthropogenic effect of human activity on the planet all points 
in the same direction: our actions are “certainly damaging [and] potentially catastrophic” (Van 
den Berg 2012c). The climate change crisis will only get worse in the coming decades if a 
coherent and international policy is not implemented as soon as possible. Currently, the largest 
emitters of carbon dioxide are the China and the U.S. If cooperative action is not taken, the 
situation will get worse. Within the next twenty to twenty-five years, China will emit more than 
the U.S. and Europe have emitted combined over the last hundred years (Stern 2008, 28). And 
China is not the only threat. As the other regional BRICS begin to industrialize, CO2 emissions 
will only increase unless there is a global carbon price mechanism to replace the Kyoto Protocol.  
Researchers and policymakers should not continue to look at the climate change crisis 
from an either/or perspective. The heterodox framework of Austrian economics revealed that 
though neoclassical market-based mechanisms offer a pragmatic solution, the theory in which it 
is rooted in does not completely justify carbon pricing.  
This investigation revealed that in terms of economic development, these results further 
support the idea that the Austrian economic framework protects the entrepreneurial discovery of 
each individual through the definition and expansion of property rights so as to avoid the tragedy 
of the commons. In terms of environmental protection, these findings suggest that the Austrian 
economic framework situates climate change mitigation in an institutional and social system that 
does not yet exist and leaves climate change adaptation to private firms and individuals. In terms 
of social equity (the last leg of the three-legged stool of sustainable development), this paper 
suggests that the Austrian economic framework, with its proposal of strict liability under tort 
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litigation, creates a legal impossibility for pollution victims. 
Thus, from the review of the literature, the findings, and the discussion of Austrian 
economics, this research suggests that “both/and” solutions, as opposed to either/or solutions, are 
necessary (Ehrhardt-Martinez et al. 2015, 226). To combat dangerous climate change, both 
mitigation and adaptation should be given equal consideration. This study also reveals that both 
neoclassical economics and Austrians economics have their limitations. Neoclassical economics 
offers a practical solution based on unsound logic. On the other hand, Austrian economics offers 
rock solid internal logic but a policy that is hard to implement.  
Thus, this paper offers the both/and solution of leaving the Kyoto Protocol for the 
creation of a global carbon price under the mechanism of carbon taxation while also 
strengthening and defining property rights where they are valid. This paper also concludes that in 
order for a carbon price mechanism to work, be it taxation or trading, there needs to be a global 
carbon price or a global emissions trading scheme that incorporates all countries. The 
investigation holds that without overwhelming cooperation, humanity will continue to inch 
closer to dangerous climate change. Unless the international community adopts a global price 
mechanism, dangerous climate change will not occur.  
Furthermore, this paper supports the viewpoint that the application of property rights to 
the public good of airspace is harder to implement, than say, for waterways and fisheries. 
However, where property rights can be more strongly defined, this paper suggests that such a 
task is undertaken. Take together, these findings support strong recommendations for Austrian 
economists, if they are truly committed to the theoretical underpinning of their policy, to take on 
the responsibility of defining property rights and creating the institutional structure for tort 
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litigation to be successful implemented.  If this paper is to provide a both/and solution to climate 
change, it should not fail to address adaptation. Though this prescription is cursory, all revenues 
from a global carbon tax could be allocated towards investments in cleaner energy sources and 
towards adaptation funds with preference given to LDCs and.  
The major limitation of this study was the sheer scope and size. This investigation 
recognizes in hindsight that covering adaptation and mitigation, as well as market-based 
mechanisms of mitigation, and alternative economic policy was a reach. This study was inspired 
by the process of asking big questions but recognizes that each section in this paper could be 
given its own treatment. Notwithstanding this limitation, this study did substantiate the claim that 
Austrian economics can contribute an entirely different perspective for dealing with the climate 
change crisis. Further research on the following questions could better under the 
interconnectedness between economic theory, sustainable development, and international justice: 
 
• How can Austrian economists overcome the institutional barriers of tort 
litigation? What does a fully defined climate change policy based solely on tort 
litigation look like? What policy proposals can other heterodox schools offer? 
What is a fair global carbon price? What should happen to carbon tax revenues?  
• What are the underlying values and assumptions within adaptation and mitigation 
strategies? Specifically, which areas will be affected first by dangerous climate 
change under BAU? To what extent are the famines in Somalia, Nigeria, South 
Sudan, and Yemen caused by already observed anthropogenic climate change? 
• In the coming years, how are economic, political, and social institutions predicted 
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to change? How will these changes impact the climate change discuss? What 
scenarios or set of circumstances encourage international cooperation? To what 
extent are sanctions helpful in coercing participation?  
  
As Joseph E. Stiglitz pointedly summarized, the world is engaged in a mass science 
experiment to determine what happens to the Earth’s temperature when excess GHGs are 
emitted. The science has been telling us all along. As far as science has revealed, this one Earth, 
this pale blue dot, is all that we have. For all of humanity regardless of nationality, this one Earth 
is home. We do not have the option to pack up and leave when temperatures increase, sea levels 
rise, ice caps melt, and climates swap. As the social and economic spheres are embedded in the 
natural sphere, climate change is not merely an environmental issue. This interconnectedness 
means that climate change is just as much an issue as economic downturn, social instability, and 
political insecurity. Climate change has the power to cause all three. Thus, it is up to us, to ask 
each other, but most importantly ask ourselves, one urgent question: how should humanity 
steward the planet?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
82 
Works Cited 
 
Adelson, Glenn, James Engell, Brent Ranalli, and K. P. Van Anglen. 2008. “The Paradox of 
Sustainable Development.” In Environment: An Interdisciplinary Anthology, edited by 
Glenn Adelson, James Engell, Brent Ranalli, and K. P. Van Anglen, 138-141. New 
Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
Adger, W. Neil, Nigel W. Arnell, and Emma L. Tompkins. 2005. “Successful Adaptation to 
Climate Change Across Scales.” Global Environmental Change 15 (2): 77–86. 
 
Adger, W. Neil, Suraje Dessai, Marisa Goulden, Mike Hulme, Irene Lorenzoni, Donald R. 
Nelson, Lars Otto Naess, Johanna Wolf, and Anita Wreford. 2009. “Are There Social 
Limits to Adaptation to Climate Change?” Climatic Change 93 (3–4): 335–54.  
 
Allen, Myles R., David J. Frame, Chris Huntingford, Chris D Jones, Jason A. Lowe, Malte 
Meinshausen, and Nicolai Meinshausen. 2009. “Warming Caused by Cumulative Carbon 
Emissions Towards the Trillionth Tonne.” Nature 458 (30): 1163–1166. 
 
Anderson, Kevin, and Alice Bows. 2011. “Beyond ‘Dangerous’ Climate Change: Emission 
Scenarios for A New World.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 369 
(1934): 20-44.  
 
Arrow, Kenneth, Bert Bolin, Robert Costanza, Partha Dasgupta, Carl Folke, C. S. Holling, 
Bengt-Owe Jansson, Simon Levin, Karl-Göran Mäler, Charles Perrings, and David 
Pimentel. 1995. "Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity, and the Environment." Science 
268 (5210): 520-521. 
 
Arrow, Kenneth, Dale Jorgenson, Paul Krugman, William Nordhaus, and Robert Solow. 1997. 
“The Economists’ Statement on Climate Change.” Redefining Progress. Released March 
29, 1997. http://rprogress.org/publications/1997/econstatement.htm. 
 
Ayres, Robert U. 2000. “Commentary on the Utility of the Ecological Footprint Concept.” 
Ecological Economics 32 (3): 347-349. 
 
Azar, Crhistian, and Kristian Lindgren. 2003. “Catastrophic Events and Stochastic Cost-Benefit 
Analysis.” Climatic Change 56 (3): 245-255. 
 
Boettke, Peter J. 2017. “Austrian Economics: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.” Library 
of Economics and Liberty. Accessed April 17, 2017. 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/AustrianSchoolofEconomics.html. 
 
Brownstein, Barry P. 1980. “Pareto Optimality, External Benefits and Public Goods: A 
Subjectivist Approach.” Journal of Libertarian Studies 4 (1): 93-106.  
 
  
 
 
83 
Büchs, Milena, Nicholas Bardsley, and Sebastian Duwe. 2011. “Who Bears the Brunt?: 
Distributional Effects of Climate Change Mitigation Policies.” Critical Social Policy 31 
(2): 285–307. 
 
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC). 2017. “World’s Countries Ranked by 
2014 Total Fossil-fuel CO2 Emissions.” Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Accessed 
March 30, 2017. http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_coun.html. 
 
Chang, Hannah. 2010. “A ‘Legally Binding’ Climate Agreement: What Does It Mean? Why 
Does It Matter?” Columbia University Earth Institute. Last modified February 23, 2010. 
http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2010/02/23/a-%E2%80%9Clegally-binding%E2%80%9D-
climate-agreement-what-does-it-mean-why-does-it-matter/. 
 
Ciplet, David, J. Timmons Roberts, and Mizan Khan. 2013. “The Politics of International 
Climate Adaptation Funding: Justice and Divisions in the Greenhouse.” Global 
Environmental Politics 13 (1): 49–68. 
 
Climate Funds Update. 2016. “The Data.” Climate Funds Update. Last modified October 2016. 
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/data. 
 
Cordato, Roy. 2004. “Toward An Austrian Theory of Environmental Economics.” The Quarterly 
Journal of Austrian Economics 7 (1): 3-16.  
 
Costanza, Robert, Ralph d’Agre, Rudolf de Groot, Stephen Farber, Monica Grasso, Bruce 
Hannon, Karl Limburg, Shahid Naeem, Robert V. O’Neill, Jose Paruelo, Robert O. 
Raskin, Paul Sutton, and Marjan ven den Belt. 1997. “The Value of the World’s 
Ecosystem Service and Natural Capital.” Nature 387 (15): 253-260. 
 
Costanza, Robert, Rudolf de Groot, Paul Sutton, Sander van der Ploeg, Sharolyn J. Anderson, 
Ida Kubiszewski, Stephen Farber, and R. Kerry Turner. 2014. “Changes in the Global 
Value of Ecosystems.” Global Environmental Change 26: 152-158. 
 
Dawson, Graham. 2011. “Free Markets, Property Rights and Climate Change: How to Privatize 
Climate Policy.” Libertarian Papers 3 (10): 1-29. 
 
———. 2013. “Austrian Economics and Climate Change.” The Review of Austrian Economics 
26 (2): 183-206. 
 
De Groot, Rudolf, Luke Brander, Sander van der Ploeg, Robert Costanza, Florence Bernard, 
Leon Braat, Mike Christie, Neville Crossman, Andrea Ghermandi, Lars Hein, Salaman 
Hussain, Pushpam Kumar, Alistair McVittie, Rosimery Portela, Luis C. Rodriguez, 
Patrick ten Brink, and Peter van Beukering. 1998. “Global Estimates of the Value of 
Ecosystems and Their Services in Monetary Units.” Environment: Science and Policy for 
Sustainable Development 40 (2): 23-28. 
 
Dolan, Edwin. 2014. “The Austrian Paradigm in Environmental Economics.” The Quarterly 
  
 
 
84 
Journal of Austrian Economics 17 (2): 197-217.  
 
Ehrhardt-Martinez, Karen, Thomas K. Rudel, Kari Marie Norgaard, and Jeffrey Broadbent. 
2015. “Mitigating Climate Change.” In Climate Change and Society: Sociological 
Perspectives, edited by Riley E. Dunlap and Robert J. Brulle, 199-234. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR). 2016. “CO2 Time Series 
1990-2015 Per Region/Country.” Joint Research Centre. Last modified October 28. 
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v=CO2ts1990-2015&sort=des9. 
 
Fankhauser, Sam. 1996. “The Potential Costs of Climate Change Adaptation.” In Adapting to 
Climate Change: An International Perspective, edited by Joel B. Smith, Neeloo Bhatti, 
Gennady Menzhulin, Ron Benioff, Mikhail I. Budyko, Max Campos, Bubu Jallow, and 
Frank Rijsberman, 80-96. New York: Springer.  
 
Fiala, Nathan. 2008. “Measuring Sustainability: Why the Ecological Footprint Is Bad Economics 
and Bad Environmental Science.” Ecological Economics 67 (4): 519-525. 
 
Finus, Michael. 2008. “The Enforcement Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: Flawed or 
Promising Concepts.” Letters in Spatial and Resources Sciences 1 (1): 13-25.  
 
Foster, John Bellamy. 1993. “‘Let Them Eat Pollution’: Capitalism and the World 
Environment.” Monthly Review 44 (4): 10+.  
 
Gupta, Joyeeta. 2010. “A History of International Climate Change Policy.” Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change Policy 1 (5): 636-653.  
 
Hansen, James, Makiko Sato, Pushker Kharecha, David Beerling, Robert Berner, Valerie 
Masson-Delmotte, Mark Pagani, Maureen Raymo, Dana L. Royer, and James C. Zachos. 
2008. “Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?” The Open Atmospheric 
Science Journal 2: 217–31.  
 
Hardin, Garrett. 1968 “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162 (3859): 1243-1248.  
 
Intergovernmental Panel on climate Change (IPCC). 1990. Climate Change 1990: Synthesis 
Report. A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the First Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Report. Accessed November 13, 2016. 
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-
en.pdf. 
 
———. 1995. Climate Change 1995: Synthesis Report. A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, 
and III to the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Report. Accessed November 13, 2016. https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/climate-
changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf. 
 
  
 
 
85 
———. 2007. Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, 
and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Geneva: Switzerland. Report. Accessed November 13, 2016. 
https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html. 
 
———. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, 
and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Geneva: Switzerland. Report. Accessed November 13, 2016. 
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/. 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on climate Change (IPCC). Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report 
Summary for Policymakers. A Contribution of Working Groups I, II, and III to the Third 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. Report. Accessed November 13, 2016. 
http://www.grida.no/publications/267. 
 
———. 2013. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Working Group I 
Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Report. Accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/. 
 
Kerr, Richard A. 2004. “Three Degrees of Consensus.” Science 305 (5686): 932-934.  
 
King, David D. 2004. “Climate Change Science: Adapt, Mitigate, or Ignore?” Science 303 
(5655): 176–77. 
 
Lind, Robert C. 1995. “Intergenerational Equity, Discounting, and the Role of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in Evaluating Climate Change Policy.” Energy Policy 23 (4-5): 379-389. 
 
Liu, Lei, Tong Wu, and Ying Huang. 2017. “An Equity-Based Framework for Defining National 
Responsibilities in Global Climate Change Mitigation.” Climate and Development 9 (2): 
152–163. 
 
Lynas, Mark. 2007. “Six Steps to Hell.” The Guardian. Last modified April 23, 2007. 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2007/apr/23/scienceandnature.climatechange. 
 
———. 2008. Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet. Washington, D.C.: National 
Geographic. 
 
Maddison, David. 1995. “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Slowing Climate Change.” Energy Policy 
23 (4-5): 337-346.  
 
Matthews, H. Damon, and Ken Caldeira. 2008. “Stabilizing Climate Requires Near-Zero 
Emissions.” Geophysical Research Letters 35 (4): 1–5. 
 
Meyers, Robinson. 2016. “When Glaciers Transform into Deadly 150-mph Avalanches.” The 
Guardian. Last modified October 18, 2016.   
  
 
 
86 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/10/glaciers-can-collapse-in-seconds-
not-years/504458/ 
 
Murphy, James M., David M. H. Sexton, David N. Barnett, Gareth S. Jones, Mark J. Webb, 
Matthew Collins, and David A. Stainforth. 2004. “Quantification of Modeling 
Uncertainties in A Large Ensemble of Climate Change Simulations.” Nature 430: 768-
772.  
 
Murphy, Robert P., Patrick J. Michaels, and Paul C. Knappenberger. 2015. “The Case Against a 
Carbon Tax.” CATO Working Paper No. 33.  
 
Nordhaus, William. 2006. “After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming.” 
The American Economic Review 96 (2): 31-34.  
 
———. 2014. “Climate Clubs: Designing a Mechanism to Overcome Free-riding in 
International Climate Policy.” American Economic Review 105 (4): 1339-1370.  
 
Pearce, David. 1998. “Auditing the Earth: The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and 
Natural Capital.” Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 40 (2): 
23-28. 
 
Petley, Dave. 2016. “The Mysterious Tibetan Ice Avalanches of Summer 2016.” The American 
Geophysical Union Blogosphere, October 24. Accessed December 04, 2016. 
http://blogs.agu.org/landslideblog/2016/10/24/tibet-avalanches-1/. 
 
Pittock, A. Barrie. 2005. “Mitigation: Limiting Climate Change.” In Climate Change: Turning 
Up the Heat, 150-195. London: Earthscan. 
 
Plater, Zygmunt J. B., Robert A. Abrams, William Goldfarb, and Robert L. Graham. 2008. “The 
Three Economies.” In Environmental: An Interdisciplinary Anthology, edited by Glenn 
Adelson, James Engell, Brent Ranalli, and K. P. Van Anglen, 727-732. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.   
 
Ravilious, Kate. 2016. “Climate Change Likely Cause of Freak Avalanches.” The Guardian. 
Last modified December 4, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/04/climate-change-likely-cause-freak-
tibet-avalanches-terrawatch. 
 
Regan, Shawn E. “Austrian Ecology: Reconciling Dynamic Economics and Ecology.” Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Policy 11 (2): 203-228. 
 
Solomon, Susan, Gian-Kasper Plattner, Reto Knti, and Pierre Freidlingstein. 2009. “Irreversible 
Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 106 (6): 1704-1700. 
 
Stainforth, David A., T. Aina, C. Christensen, M. Collins, N. Faull, D. J. Frame, J. A. 
  
 
 
87 
Kettleborough, S. Knight, A. Martin, J. M. Murphy, C. Piani, D. Sexton, L. A. Smith, R. 
A. Spicer, A. J. Thorpe, and M. R. Allen. 2005. “Uncertainty in Prediction of the Climate 
Response to Rising Levels of Greenhouse Gases.” Nature 433 (7024): 403-406. 
 
Stern, Nicholas. 2007. The Economics of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
———. 2008. “The Economics of Climate Change.” American Economic Review: Papers & 
Proceedings 98 (2): 1–37. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2006a. “A New Agenda for Global Warming.” The Economists’ Voice 3 (7): 
1-4.  
 
———. 2006b. “Saving the Planet.” In Making Globalization Work, 161-196. New York: W. W. 
Norton and Company.  
 
———. 2010. “Overcoming the Copenhagen Failure.” Project Syndicate. Accessed April 30, 
2017. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/overcoming-the-copenhagen-
failure. 
 
Stocker, Ferry. 1997. “Can ‘Austrian Economics’ Provide a New Approach to Environmental 
Policy?” Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, No. 15: 1-20. 
 
Summers, Lawrence. 1992a. “Let Them Eat Pollution.” The Economist, February 8. Accessed 
December 4, 2016. 
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=AONE&sw=w&u=wint47629&v=2.1&id=GALE%7
CA11819818&it=r&asid=3f4d7626cb312149bf06949ac315d6de. 
 
———. 1992b. “Summers on Sustainable Growth.” The Economist, May 30. Accessed 
December 4, 2016. http://search.proquest.com/docview/224146932?accountid=13584 
 
Tol, Richard S. J. 2002. “Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change.” Environmental 
and Resource Economics 21 (1): 47-73. 
 
———. 2003. “Is the Uncertainty about Climate Change Too Large for Cost-Benefit Analysis.” 
Climatic Change 56 (3): 265-289. 
 
UNFCCC. 2017a. “First Steps to A Safer Future: Introducing the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change.” Accessed April 1, 2017. 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php. 
 
———. 2017b. “Parties and Observers.” Accessed April 1, 2017. 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php. 
 
———. 2017c. “Party Groupings.” Accessed April 1, 2017. 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/2714.php. 
  
 
 
88 
 
———. 2017d. “Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.” Accessed April 15, 2017. 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php. 
 
Van den Berg, Hendrik. 2012a. "Interdependence!" In International Economics: A Heterodox 
Approach, 3-27. 2nd ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
———. 2012b. “The Complexity of Economic Development.” In Economic Growth and 
Development, 1-58. 2nd ed. New Jersey: World Scientific Publishing Co. 
 
———. 2012c. "The Evolving International Economy." In International Economics: A 
Heterodox Approach, 557-84. 2nd ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
———. 2012d. "The Heterodox Approach." In International Economics: A Heterodox 
Approach, 28-51. 2nd ed. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Van den Bergh, Jeroen C.J.M. 2004. “Optimal Climate Policy Is A Utopia: From Quantitative to 
Qualitative Cost-Benefit Analysis.” Ecological Economics 48 (4): 385-393. 
 
Van den Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M., and Harmen Verbruggen. 1999. “Spatial Sustainability, Trade 
and Indicators: An Evaluation of the ‘Ecological Footprint’.” Ecological Economics 29, 
(1): 61-72. 
 
Von Mises, Ludwig. 1977. “Comments About the Mathematical Treatment of Economic 
Problems.” Journal of Libertarian Studies 1 (2): 97-100. 
 
———. 1998. A Treatise on Economics: Human Action, The Scholar’s Edtion. Auburn: Ludwig 
von Mises Institute. 
 
Wackernagel, Mathis, Niels B. Schulz, Diana Deumling, Alejandro Callejas Linares, Martin 
Jenkins, Valerie Kapos, Chad Monfreda, Jonathan Loh, Norman Myers, Richard 
Norgaard, and Jørgen Randers. 2002. “Tracking the Ecological Overshoot of the Human 
Economy.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 (14): 9266-9271. 
 
Wackernagel, Mathis. 1999. "What We Use and What We Have: Ecological Footprint and 
Ecological Capacity." Redefining Progress. 
https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/49503/mod_resource/content/1/texto17.pdf. 
 
World Bank. 2016. “CO2 Emissions (kt).” World Bank Group. Accessed March 30. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.KT?year_high_desc=true. 
 
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). 1987. Our Common Future. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
———. 2008. “World Commission on Environment and Development.” In Environment: An 
Interdisciplinary Anthology, edited by Glenn Adelson, James Engell, Brent Ranalli, and 
  
 
 
89 
K. P. Van Anglen, 142-144. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
World Resources Institute. 2017. “CAIT Climate Data Explorer.” World Resources Institute. 
Accessed March 30. 
http://cait2.wri.org/historical/Country%20GHG%20Emissions?indicator[]=Total%20GH
G%20Emissions%20Excluding%20Land-
Use%20Change%20and%20Forestry&indicator[]=Total%20GHG%20Emissions%20Incl
uding%20Land-
Use%20Change%20and%20Forestry&year[]=2013&sortIdx=0&sortDir=desc&chartTyp
e=bars. 
  
  
 
 
90 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A: List of Annex I Countries 
 
● Australia 
● Austria 
● Belarus 
● Belgium 
● Bulgaria 
● Canada 
● Cyprus 
● Czech Republic 
● Denmark 
● Estonia 
● European Union 
● Finland 
● France 
● Germany 
● Greece 
● Hungary 
● Iceland 
● Italy 
● Japan 
● Latvia 
● Liechtenstein 
● Lithuania 
● Luxembourg 
● Malta 
● Netherlands 
● New Zealand 
● Norway 
● Poland 
● Portugal 
● Romania 
● Russian Federation 
● Slavakia 
● Slovenia 
● Spain 
● Sweden 
● Turkey 
● Ukraine 
● United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 
● United States of America
Source: UNFCCC. 2017. “List of Annex I Parties to the Convention.” Accessed April 1, 2017.  
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php. 
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Appendix B: List of Countries with Economies in Transition 
(EITs) 
 
● Belarus 
● Bulgaria 
● Croatia 
● Czech Republic 
● Estonia 
● Hungary 
● Latvia 
● Lithuania 
● Poland 
● Romania 
● Russian Federation 
● Slovakia 
● Slovenia 
● Ukraine 
 
Source: UNFCCC. 2017. “The Climate Change Convention.” Accessed April 1, 2017. 
http://unfccc.int/not_assigned/b/items/2555.php. 
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Appendix C: List of Annex II Countries 
 
● Australia 
● Austria 
● Belgium 
● Canada 
● Denmark 
● European Union 
● Finland 
● France 
● Germany 
● Greece 
● Iceland 
● Ireland 
● Italy 
● Japan 
● Luxembourg 
● Netherlands 
● New Zealand 
● Norway 
● Portugal 
● Spain 
● Sweden 
● Switzerland 
● Turkey 
● United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
● United States of America 
 
Source: IPCC. 2001. Climate Change 2001: Appendix V List of Annex I, Annex II, and Annex B Countries. 
A Contribution of Working Group III to the First Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Report. Accessed April 1, 2017. 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/tar/wg3/index.php?idp=478. 
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Appendix D: List of Non-Annex I Countries 
 
● Afghanistan  
● Albania 
● Algeria 
● Andorra 
● Angola 
● Antigua and Barbuda 
● Argentina 
● Armenia 
● Azerbaijan 
● Bahamas 
● Bahrain 
● Bangladesh 
● Barbados 
● Belize 
● Benin 
● Bhutan 
● Bolivia 
● Bosnia and Herzegovina 
● Botswana 
● Brazil 
● Brunei Darussalam 
● Burkina Faso 
● Burundi 
● Cambodia 
● Cabo Verde 
● Cameroon 
● Central African Republic 
● Chad 
● Chile 
● China 
● Colombia 
● Comoros 
● Congo 
● Cook Islands 
● Costa Rica 
● Cuba 
● Côte d’Ivoire 
● Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea 
● Democratic Republic of the Congo 
● Djbouti 
● Dominica 
● Dominican Republic 
● Ecuador 
● Egypt 
● El Salvador 
● Equatorial Guinea 
● Eritrea 
● Ethiopia 
● Fiji 
● Gabon 
● Gambia 
● Georgia 
● Ghana 
● Grenada 
● Guatemala 
● Guinea 
● Guinea-Bissau 
● Guyana 
● Haiti 
● Honduras 
● India 
● Indonesia 
● Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
● Iraw 
● Israel 
● Jamaica 
● Jordan  
● Kazakhstan 
● Kenya 
● Kiribati 
● Kuwait 
● Kyrgzstan 
● Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
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● Lebanon  
● Lesotho 
● Liberia 
● Libya 
● Madagascar 
● Malawi 
● Malaysia 
● Maldives 
● Mali 
● Marshall Islands 
● Mauritania 
● Mauritius 
● Mexico 
● Micronesia (Federated States of) 
● Mongolia 
● Montenegro 
● Morocco 
● Mozambique 
● Myanmar 
● Namibia 
● Nauru 
● Nepal 
● Nicaragua 
● Niger 
● Nigeria 
● Niue 
● Oman  
● Pakistan 
● Palsu 
● Palestine 
● Panama 
● Papua New Guinea 
● Paraguay 
● Peru 
● Phiippines 
● Qatar 
● Republic of Korea 
● Republic of Moldova 
● Rwanda 
● Saint Kitts and Nevis 
● Saint Lucia 
● Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
● Samoa 
● San Marino 
● Sao Tome and Principe 
● Saudi Arabia 
● Senegal 
● Serbia 
● Seychelles 
● Sierra Leone 
● Singapore 
● Solomon Islands 
● Somalia 
● South Africa 
● South Sudan  
● Sri Lanka 
● Sudan  
● Suriname 
● Swaziland 
● Syrian Arab Republic  
● Tajikistan 
● Thailand 
● The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
● Timor-Leste 
● Togo 
● Tonga 
● Trinidad and Tobago  
● Tunisia 
● Turkmenistan 
● Tuvalu  
● Uganda 
● United Arab Emirates 
● United Republic of Tanzania 
● Uruguay 
● Uzbekistan 
● Vanatu 
● Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
● Viet Nam 
● Yemen  
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● Zambia ● Zimbabwe
 
Source: UNFCCC. 2017. “List of Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention.” Accessed April 1, 2017.  
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php. 
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Appendix E: List of European Union (EU) Countries 
 
● Austria 
● Belgium 
● Bulgaria 
● Croatia 
● Cyprus  
● Czech Republic 
● Denmark 
● Estonia 
● Finland 
● France 
● Germany 
● Greece 
● Hungary 
● Ireland 
● Italy 
● Latvia 
● Lithuania 
● Luxembourg 
● Malta 
● Netherlands 
● Poland 
● Portugal 
● Romania 
● Slovakia 
● Slovenia 
● Spain 
● Sweden 
● United Kingdom 
 
Source: Europa. 2017. “EU Member Countries in Brief.” Last modified April 18, 2017. 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en. 
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Appendix F: List of Umbrella Group Countries* 
 
● Australia 
● Canada 
● Japan 
● New Zealand 
● Kazakhstan 
● Norway 
● The Russian Federation 
● Ukraine 
● United States 
 
Source: UNFCCC. 2017. “Party Groupings.” Accessed April 1, 2017. 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/2714.php. 
 
*The UNFCCC “Party Groupings” website mentions that there is no official listing of Umbrella Countries, 
though the above list is a usual grouping.  
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Appendix G: List of OPEC Countries 
 
● Algeria 
● Angola 
● Ecuador 
● Gabon 
● Iran 
● Iraq 
● Kuwait 
● Libya 
● Nigeria 
● Qatar 
● Saudi Arabia 
● United Arab Emirates 
● Venzuela  
 
Source: OPEC. 2017. “Member Countries.” Accessed April 1, 2017. 
http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/25.htm. 
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Appendix H: List of G-77 Countries 
 
● Afghanistan 
● Algeria 
● Angola 
● Antigua and Barbuda 
● Agentina 
● Bahamas 
● Bahrain 
● Bangladesh 
● Barbados 
● Belize 
● Benin 
● Bhutan 
● Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 
● Bosnia and Herzegovina 
● Botswana 
● Brazil 
● Brunei Darussalam 
● Burkina Faso 
● Burundi 
● Cabo Verde 
● Cambodia 
● Cameroon 
● Central African Republic 
● Chad 
● Chile 
● China 
● Colombia 
● Comoros 
● Congo 
● Costa Rica 
● Côte d’Ivoire 
● Cuba 
● Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea 
● Democratic Republic of the Congo  
● Djbouti 
● Dominica 
● Dominican Republic 
● Ecuador 
● Egypt 
● El Salvador  
● Equatorial Guinea 
● Eritrea 
● Ethiopia 
● Fiji 
● Gabon 
● Gambia 
● Ghana 
● Grenada 
● Guatemala 
● Guinea 
● Guinea-Bissau 
● Guyana 
● Haiti 
● Honduras 
● India 
● Indonesia 
● Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
● Iraq 
● Jamaica 
● Jordan 
● Kenya 
● Kiribati 
● Kuwait 
● Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
● Lebanon 
● Lesothos 
● Liberia 
● Libya 
● Madagascar 
● Malawi 
● Malaysia 
● Maldives 
● Mali 
● Marshall Islands 
● Mauritania 
● Mauritius 
● Micronesia (Federated States of) 
● Mongolia 
● Morocco 
● Mozambique 
● Myanmar 
● Namibia 
● Nauru 
● Nepal 
● Nicaragua 
● Niger 
● Nigeria 
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● Oman 
● Pakistan 
● Panama 
● Papua New Guinea 
● Paraguay 
● Peru 
● Philippines 
● Qatar 
● Rwanda 
● Saint Kitts and Nevis 
● Saint Lucia 
● Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
● Samoa 
● Sao Tome and Principe 
● Saudi Arabia 
● Senegal 
● Seychelles 
● Sierra Leone 
● Singapore 
● Solomon Islands 
● Somalia 
● South Africa 
● Sri Lanka 
● State of Palestine 
● Sudan 
● Suriname 
● Swaziland  
● Syrian Arab Republic 
● Tajikistan 
● Thailand 
● Timor-Leste 
● Togo 
● Tonga 
● Trinidad and Tobago 
● Tunisia 
● Turkmenistan 
● United Arab Emirates 
● United Republic of Tanzania 
● Uruguay 
● Vanuatu 
● Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
● Viet Nam 
● Yemen 
● Zambia 
● Zimbabwe
 
Source: The Group of 77. 2017. “The Member States the Group 77.” Accessed April 1, 2017. 
http://www.g77.org/doc/members.html. 
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Appendix I: List of African States 
 
● Algeria 
● Angola 
● Botswana 
● Burkina Faso 
● Burundi 
● Cabo Verde 
● Cameroon 
● Central African Republic 
● Chad 
● Comoros 
● Congo 
● Côte d’Ivoire 
● Democratic Republic of the Congo 
● Djbouti 
● Egypt 
● Equatorial Guinea 
● Eritrea 
● Ethiopia 
● Gabon 
● Gambia 
● Ghana 
● Guinea 
● Guinea-Bissau 
● Kenya 
● Lesotho 
● Liberia 
● Libya 
● Madagascar 
● Malawi 
● Mali 
● Mauritania 
● Mauritius 
● Morocco 
● Mozambique 
● Namibia 
● Niger 
● Nigeria 
● Rwanda 
● São Tomé and Principe 
● Senegal 
● Seychelles 
● Sierra Leone 
● Somalia 
● South AFrica 
● South Sudan 
● Sudan 
● Swaziland 
● Togo 
● Tunisia 
● Uganda 
● United Republic of Tanzania 
● Zambia 
● Zimbabwe
 
Source: UN. 2014. “United Nations Regional Groups of Member States.” Last modified May 9. 2014. 
http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml. 
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Appendix J: List of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) 
 
● Antigua and Barbuda 
● Bahamas 
● Barbados 
● Belize 
● Cabo Verde 
● Comoros 
● Cuba 
● Dominica 
● Dominican Republic 
● Fiji 
● Grenada 
● Guinea-Bissau 
● Guyana 
● Haiti 
● Jamaica 
● Kiribati 
● Maldives 
● Marshall Islands 
● Mauritius 
● Micronesia (Federated States of) 
● Nauru 
● Palau 
● Papua New Guinea 
● Saint Kitts and Nevis 
● Saint Lucia 
● Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
● Samoa 
● São Tomé and Principe 
● Seychelles 
● Singapore 
● Solomon Islands 
● Suriname 
● Timor-Leste 
● Tonga 
● Trinidad and Tobago 
● Tuvalu 
● Vanatu 
 
 
Source: UN Division for Sustainable Development. 2017. “List of SIDS.” Accessed April 1, 2017. 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sids/list. 
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Appendix K: List of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
 
● Afghanistan 
● Angola 
● Bangladesh 
● Benin 
● Bhutan 
● Burkina Faso 
● Burundi 
● Cambodia 
● Central African Republic 
● Chad 
● Comoros 
● Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 
● Djbouti 
● Equatorial Guinea 
● Eritrea 
● Ethiopia 
● Gambia 
● Guinea 
● Guinea-Bissau 
● Haiti 
● Kiribati 
● Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
● Lesotho 
● Liberia 
● Madagascar 
● Malawi 
● Mali 
● Mauritania 
● Mozambique 
● Myanmar 
● Nepal 
● Niger 
● Rwanda 
● Samoa 
● São Tomé and Principe 
● Senegal 
● Sierra Leone 
● Solomon Islands 
● Somalia 
● Sudan 
● Timor-Leste 
● Togo 
● Tuvalu 
● Uganda 
● United Republic of Tanzania 
● Vanatu 
● Yemen 
● Zambia
 
Source: UN Conference on Trade and Development. 2017. “UN List of Least Developed Countries.” 
Accessed April 1, 2017. http://unctad.org/en/pages/aldc/Least%20Developed%20Countries/UN-list-of-
Least-Developed-Countries.aspx. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
